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INVENTORS OF THE WORLD, UNITE!




Many successful inventions have developed acciden-
tally.1 The now omnipresent "Post-it" note evolved out of a
failed attempt to make super-strong adhesive.2 A recently
developed nontoxic replacement for dry cleaning solvents was
unintentionally invented during research into the use of car-
bon dioxide to synthesize polymers. 3 An inventor attempting
to originate a new type of Freon inadvertently invented
Teflon.4 The accidental observation that radio waves
bounced off passing ships led to the idea for radar, and an
experiment with a magnetron that resulted in a chocolate bar
melting in the pocket of a researcher led to the microwave
oven. 5 The spontaneous origination of revolutionary and
profitable ideas such as these can be comparable to winning a
well endowed lottery, but who should get to pocket the check?
While technological innovation is often lauded as the cor-
nerstone of the American economy into the next century, and
both governmental and private observers ponder with fasci-
nation and some trepidation the ability of U.S. companies to
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reach and sustain high levels of innovative productivity, very
little attention is paid to actual inventors. This article is one
effort to draw attention to the importance of employee-inven-
tors, the people who conceive and develop the inventions that
American corporations rely on for growth and profitability.
Though "it is universally accepted that skills gained by an
employee in the course of his employment belong to him
alone,"6 when a patentable invention results from the diligent
application of these skills, most employee-inventors are com-
pletely deprived of all ownership rights and privileges.
The role of employee-inventors within their employing
entities (hereinafter referred to as "inventor employers") and
within society is unique. An inventive individual with spe-
cialized scientific training who toils in a research facility per-
forms a very different social and economic function than an
assembly line or service worker, educated or not, who rotely
performs the same small repertoire of tasks. While the as-
sembly line or service worker can be expected to produce a
predictable amount of goods or services within a given time
frame, and with a value that can be accurately estimated,
even brilliant and diligent labor by a properly equipped and
well supported inventor offers no assurance of a profitable or
even useful outcome, regardless of the amount of money or
time invested. A corporation cannot just build a laboratory,
stock it with equipment, hire individuals proficient in the ap-
plicable technology and expect patentable inventions to be
methodically produced. Because an employer of potential in-
ventors, typically a large corporation, assumes the financial
risk that investments in research and development will not
generate a positive return, the employer expects to reap the
full rewards of any profitable invention. One of the ways
such an inventor employer typically seeks to accomplish this
goal is by requiring all potential inventors (and, increasingly,
all but the most marginal employees)7 on its payroll to sign
pre-invention assignment agreements as a condition of em-
6. Paul C. Van Slyke & Mark M. Friedman, Employer's Rights to Inven-
tions and Patents of its Officer's, Directors & Employees, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.
AsS'N Q.J. 127, 134 (1990).
7. See Neal Orkin, The Legal Rights of the Employed Inventor: New Ap-
proaches to Old Problems (Part 1), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 648, 651 (1974) (noting




ployment. s These agreements require signatory employees to
assign to the employer all rights to inventions conceived by
the employee while at work, or in subject matters related to
work, or while using any resources of the employer.9 Because
employee-inventors may themselves invest extraordinary
amounts of time, education, training, intellect, energy, and
waking and sleeping thought to the innovative and usually
complex ideas they originate and reduce to practice, and be-
cause such employee-inventors may not be able to secure any
employment in their areas of expertise unless they sign pre-
invention assignment agreements, 10 such agreements are un-
fair to innovators.11
It is unjust that an employer reaps all of the rewards of a
valuable patent as the "payoff' for the resources it devotes to
an invention, but an employee-inventor who has also made a
substantial investment in the inventive process-potentially
at a level of personal sacrifice disproportionately greater than
any financial or "opportunity cost" risk assumed by the em-
ployer-is usually precluded by a pre-invention assignment
agreement from profiting from the fruits of his or her labor in
a manner commensurate with, or even proportional to, the
value and utility of an invention, and may not benefit from
8. See Mark B. Herskovitz, Unhitching the Trailer Clause: The Right of
Inventive Employees and Their Employers, 3 J. INTELL. PRop. L. 187 (1995).
Even when there is no such contract between the employee and employer,
courts will sometimes find that a pre-invention assignment agreement between
the parties was "implied." See Teets v. Chromally Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d
403 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Fish v. Air-O-Fan Prods. Corp., 285 F.2d 208 (9th
Cir. 1960); E.F. Drew & Co. v. Reinhard, 170 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1948).
9. See Hershovitz, supra note 8, at 197.
10. See supra note 7; infra Part II. See also Ron Riley, Inventors Deserve
Their Fair Share, MACHINE DESIGN, Mar. 21, 1994, at 109 ("All companies pres-
ent a unified front to potential employees with [pre-invention assignment] con-
tracts that deny inventors fair compensation.").
11. The inventive employee has persuasive claims to inventions
developed during the employment relationship. Recognizing the valu-
able resources that employers invest in an inventive employee's crea-
tive talent, it is still an employee's genius that coalesces concepts into
inventions. Compared to the resources provided by the employer, the
inventive employee views his genius as an equal, if not greater, ingre-
dient in the inventive process.
Hershovitz, supra note 8, at 190 (footnotes omitted). See also Riley, supra note
10, at 109 ("Inventors tend to work night and day to develop their ideas. Inven-
tions are usually the result of years or decades of experience and dedication.
The effort that goes into creating a patentable idea is far greater than what is
reasonable to expect from an employee.").
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her invention at all. 12 In fact, as discussed below, employee-
inventors are often "rewarded" for innovations with group
censure and the loss of their jobs.13 Thus, the patent laws of
the United States, which are intended to foster innovation,
are premised on the now false assumption that inventors
own, and therefore benefit from, the patents obtained on their
inventions. In fact, the monopoly incentive completely side-
steps inventors, who have no incentive to innovate if they can
find a better job doing something else. 4
12. A corollary to the inventive employee's belief that the value of
his creative genius should vest the rights to his invention in himself is
the belief that inventive employees are under-compensated for inven-
tions they create. This belief is not unfounded. Many large American
corporations known for their efforts in research and development do
not give bonuses to employees who receive patents. For those compa-
nies that do reward successful inventive employees, it is not uncom-
mon for the reward to be as little as one dollar if not merely a congratu-
latory plaque. This holds true regardless of the value of the invention
to the employer.
Hershovitz, supra note 8, at 190-91 (footnotes omitted). See also Riley, supra
note 10, at 109 ("[Pre-invention assignment agreements] drain a person's pro-
ductivity in the same manner that communist countries stifled their workers
[sic] will to produce. Pure socialism does not motivate people to be productive,
yet we tolerate a socialist approach to inventions as the norm in the U.S. This
practice harms our competitive position because it leads many inventors and
potential inventors to ignore developing their ideas. Capitalism as an incentive
system, on the other hand, works well because individuals work hardest when
they stand to personally gain from their efforts. The same principle applies to
motivating creative people.").
13. See discussion infra Part I.B.
14. According to law professor Samuel Oddi, every moral justification for
our current patent system assumes that it is the inventor that reaps the re-
wards of a profitable patent. A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AMv. U. L. REV. 1097, 1107-08 (1989)
[hereinafter Oddi I]. He asserts that, for example, the Natural Right theory
holds that all inventors are entitled to patents as their own property. Id. He
states that the Reward by Monopoly theory assumes that inventors should re-
ceive rewards for their inventions in proportion to the invention's usefulness to
society, and that this is best achieved by awarding monopolistic patents to in-
ventors. Id. Similarly, he claims the Patent as Privilege theory contends that
patents are granted to inventors in the interest of society as an inducement to
create and disclose inventions. Id.
Furthermore, noted intellectual property lawyer Kate Murashige explained
in her article that:
Commentary suggests that a patent system (whereby an inventor
is rewarded for his contribution to progress by being granted a limited
monopoly in exchange for a complete disclosure of the invention to the
public) can have either or both of two philosophical bases. Either the
monopoly is conferred because the inventor 'deserves' it or because so-
ciety wishes to induce the investment of time and resources necessary
to create the invention. It is simpler to design a patent protection sys-
EMPLOYEE-INVENTORS
This article first reviews the disincentives to innovate' 5
confronting the typical employee-inventor, 16 who is forced to
assign all of the rights to any patentable invention she devel-
ops to her employer without compensation. Next, this article
considers mechanisms for eliminating (or at least minimiz-
ing) these disincentives suggested by other scholars, the im-
plementation of which require either new legislation or
changes in judicial interpretation, or sometimes both. Fi-
nally, this article proposes a unique solution for solving the
disincentive problem: Rather than waiting for Congressional
or Judicial action, as neither is likely imminent, inventors
should organize and act collectively, by refusing to sign any
pre-invention assignment agreements in the future, by "re-
voking" pre-invention assignment agreements currently in
effect (either through negotiations with the companies they
work for, or by changing jobs and refusing to sign such agree-
ments with new employers), and by retaining ownership of
their patented inventions to exploit or license themselves, or
with the assistance of a patent collective organized by and for
inventors.
I am far from the first lawyer with an intellectual prop-
erty background to notice and write about the plight of indi-
vidual inventors. 7 However, this article does propose a solu-
tern to exert one or the other desired effect. If the monopoly is simply
the inventor's just reward, a certain infrastructure and system of val-
ues must exist to make the monopoly useful. Such use could occur
either directly through exploitation by the inventor or his agents or
through the ability of the inventor to "hold up" other potential manu-
facturers or distributors by requiring licenses to some portion of the
end product.
Kate Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 591, 592
(1994) (footnotes omitted).
15. For the purposes of this article the terms "invent" and "innovate" will be
used synonymously, as will "invention" and "innovation."
16. The term "employee-inventor" is used to refer to any employee who in-
vents, or has the potential to invent a patentable product or process. It does not
refer strictly to employees who are specifically hired to research and develop
new patentable inventions.
17. See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Incentives for People: The Forgotten Purpose
of the Patent System, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 129 (1979) [hereinafter Dratler];
Mark B. Baker & Andre J. Brunel, Restructuring the Judicial Evaluation of
Employed Inventors' Rights, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 399 (1991) [hereinafter Baker
& Brunel]; Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inven-
tors, Pre-Invention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 597 (1993) [hereinafter Cherensky]; William P. Hovell, Patent Owner-
ship: An Employer's Rights to His Employee's Invention, 58 NonTE DAME L.
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tion that does not require substantive action by either the
Legislature or the courts'" (though some might be helpful),
but simply organized activity on the part of employee-inven-
tors. Although the collective action proposed is somewhat
novel in the patent context, allowing employee-inventors to
retain ownership of their patents is hardly a radical idea. In
fact, unless an employee is specifically hired to invent some-
thing in particular (an "invention-for-hire"), retention of own-
ership by the inventor is exactly what the common law dic-
tates, which is the very reason employers force pre-invention
REV. 863 (1983) [hereinafter Hovell]; Henrik D. Parker, Note, Reform for Rights
of Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 608 (1984) [hereinafter Parker].
One individual rather colorfully described his assessment of the very situa-
tion I am describing as follows:
The reason the United States is falling behind Japan and Ger-
many in technology and industrial competitiveness may be because
Germany and Japan have mandatory compensation for employed in-
ventors, whereas in the United States, employed inventors are forced
to sign contracts relinquishing any rights to their inventions. The sci-
entist is a calculating man, just like the businessman or accountant,
maybe even better with figures. He thinks, "What if I bust my neurons
and come up with a great invention, like the light bulb or transistor?
The most I could hope for from my tightwad employer would be a dollar
as a legal consideration for assigning the invention. Maybe I should
just take it easy and do basic research, or hack work in product and
process improvement." This may be why Thomas Edison was drenched
in perspiration 99 percent of the time (a patent every two weeks).
Edison had incentives: He could earn a hundred grand or so from an
invention - good money in those days. The reader might ponder
whether it is more important to be first in science and technology, or in
business management. The Gulf War demonstrated the efficacy of
technological superiority. Perhaps the founding fathers were right in
giving Congress the power to grant inventors the exclusive rights to
their inventions, and perhaps it is time for Congress to exercise this
prerogative.
Jim Benson & Irving Park, Editorial, CHI. SuN-TIMES, June 22, 1994, at 40.
18. Neither Congress nor any Federal Court has shown any marked incli-
nation to increase incentives to innovate by legislatively or doctrinally strength-
ening the positions of employee-inventors. Congressional failure to act is de-
scribed infra, and rulings by the Federal Circuit in employee/employer disputes
have generally favored employer inventors. See, e.g., Teets v. Chromalloy Gas
Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (employee hired for general pur-
pose who developed patentable invention found to be party to "implied in fact"
pre-invention assignment agreement and was therefore required to assign
rights in invention to employer). See also Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownership
Rights of Employee Inventions: The Role of Pre-invention Assignment Agree-
ments and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163, 172-73 (1994) (foot-
note omitted) ("The general tendency of the courts to uphold these contracts
demonstrates the significant power that has been transferred to the employer
and taken away from the employee by way of the preinvention agreement.").
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assignment agreements upon their new hires so
aggressively. 19
II. SUBVERSION OF THE GOALS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
A. Investment is Treated as a Proxy for Invention
It has long been acknowledged that two major proposi-
tions underlie the patent system of the United States: First,
American patent law "encourages more invention and inno-
vation than our economic system would otherwise provide;
and second, a statutory monopoly is the best inducement for
inventors under a patent system."2 °
Most non-inventor participants in innovative ventures
such as managers, venture capitalists, and intellectual prop-
erty lawyers appear to agree with the general sentiment that
an inventor should reap rewards for her inventions.
21 Most of
these individuals also agree, usually emphatically, that the
possibility of lucrative economic return spurs innovation.22
In fact, most would articulate the goals of the patent law and
the patent system as being to reward and encourage inven-
19. See discussion infra Part II. See also Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, for
a detailed description of how the common law allocates rights in a patentable
invention between employees and employers.
20. Oddi I, supra note 14, at 1113.
21. A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS - Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Eco-
nomic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 415 (1996) [hereinafter Oddi II].
Generally two lines of reasoning have been offered as natural-
rights justifications for patents. One is the "first occupancy" thesis:
The person who discovers or creates an invention should be entitled
morally to its exclusive use. This appears to be the approach of the
"rights of man" implemented in the French Patent Act of 1791. The
other thesis is a "labor" justification for natural rights treatment. It is
based on the principle that the person who expends labor in creating
intellectual property-an invention-should be morally entitled to the
fruits of that labor. This is a Lockean approach based upon the prem-
ise that labor is unpleasant, and those who engage in it deserve, in
justice, to be rewarded. There is, however, an instrumentalist aspect
to this theory, in that society should want to provide rewards to induce
individuals to engage in distasteful but socially beneficial labor.
Id. at 427-28 (footnote omitted).
22. See, e.g., Murashige, supra note 14, at 594 ("There is no question that
the patent system encourages research, development, and beneficially rewards
successful R&D outcomes."). See also Hershovitz, supra note 8, at 189 ("The
prospect of a limited monopoly is a powerful incentive encouraging the creating
of intellectual property. Indeed, courts have recognized the prospect of receiv-
ing a patent as an inducement to invent and invest.").
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tors.23 However, these same individuals will undoubtedly
strongly oppose the proposal for collective action contained in
this article, because in their world view, the term "inventor"
connotes the corporation, university or other macroentity
that gave rise to the invention and it is the employers of in-
ventors, and not the inventors themselves, who should reap
the benefits of patent monopolies.
The generally unstated assumption that institutions
such as corporations or universities are the "real" inventors is
evidenced by the fact that the two are often used interchange-
ably by intellectual property law practioners, and even some-
times scholars,24 despite the fact that by statute only living,
breathing people can be named in patents as inventors.25
Even those who happen to notice the difference between em-
ployee-inventors and inventor employers don't seem particu-
larly troubled by the distinction. For example, in "Justifying
Intellectual Property," philosopher Edwin Hettinger notes in
passing, toward the end of his article that generally "prospec-
tive employees are required to give the rights to their inven-
tions and works of authorship to their employers as a condi-
tion of employment, and independent authors or inventors
23. Some would argue that only the encouragement of innovation is a goal
of the patent system, and that rewarding inventors with a temporary monopoly
is simply a necessary evil. See, e.g., Oddi I, supra note 14, at 1107-10.
24. See generally Oddi I, supra note 14; Oddi II, supra note 21; Murashige,
supra note 14.
25. The Patent Act states that, "A person shall be entitled to a patent...."
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1972). In fact, being named and registered as the inventor of a
patented product or process is typically the only twig out of the bundle of prop-
erty rights bestowed on a patented invention that an employee-inventor who
has signed a pre-invention assignment agreement can even hope to hold on to.
Cf Lucy Gamon, Patent Law in the Context of Corporate Research, 8 J. CORP. L.
497, 512-13 (1983) ("The most drastic suggestion for changing the current pat-
ent law to accommodate the inventive process of the corporate research team
would be to allow corporate patents. The entire corporation would be treated as
a monolithic entity and be allowed to sign the patent application in its own
name. Two coworkers employed by the same corporation could file a joint appli-
cation or be listed as co-inventors on an application that the corporation filed. If
a corporation, as the real party in interest, were permitted to sign the patent
application of employees, the knowledge of new inventions released to the pub-
lic would be greatly increased. Instead of keeping their inventions secret, cor-
porations would disclose them in patent applications. The definition of prior art
for the corporation would be that which is obvious to a person having 'ordinary
skill in the art' outside the corporation at the time when the invention was be-
ing manufactured within the corporation. It would seem to be of little signifi-
cance to the public which employees contributed to the final invention, since all
the patent rights will eventually belong to the corporation anyway.").
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who earn their living by selling their writings or inventions to
others are increasingly rare."26 This aside is contained in
Hettinger's essay examining the philosophical basis for intel-
lectual property rights, in which he chose to focus on the "la-
bor arguments for intellectual property, one based on desert
[as a function of effort], the other based on a natural entitle-
ment to the fruits of one's labor,"27 when he might have more
usefully considered desert as a function of investment and
natural entitlement to the fruits of one's employee's labor.28
In addition, in at least one case, several judges who now sit
on the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals drew a jurispruden-
tial distinction between human inventors and the "true in-
ventive entity" that employed them.29 It is this refusal to see
individual human beings as the sparks necessary to ignite
sometimes enormous research and development engines that
26. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 Pin. & PuB.
AFF. 31, 46 (1989).
27. Id. at 43.
28. He goes even further afield in a discussion of whether "the right to ex-
clude others from using one's invention or copying one's work of authorship" is
"essential" to an individual's sense of sovereignty, security and privacy, and in-
ventor employers will be relieved to note that he decides that it is not. Id. at 45-
46. Employers, inventors or potential inventors will be even more assuaged
that while he makes the management-troubling assertion that "[aln author's or
inventor's sense of worth and dignity requires public acknowledgment by those
who use the writing [or invention]," he concludes that "giving the author or
inventor the exclusive right to copy or use her intellectual product is not neces-
sary to protect this ... [and is] not important to one's privacy." Id. Hettinger
then considers whether "intellectual property is a necessary incentive for inno-
vation and a requirement for healthy and fair competition." Id. at 47. He as-
serts that "[tlhe strongest and most widely appealed to justification for intellec-
tual property is an utilitarian argument based on providing incentives," and
that "the justifiability of copyrights, patents, and trade secrets depends, in the
final analysis, on this utilitarian defense." Id. In other words, he concludes
that according to the utilitarian argument, which he claims is the only viable
justification for the existence of the patent system altogether, "promoting the
creation of valuable works requires that intellectual laborers be granted prop-
erty works in those works," yet does not appear particularly concerned that by
extrapolation of his own analysis, the creation of valuable works is not cur-
rently being promoted by the patent laws because, as he admits, "intellectual
laborers . . . are required to give the rights to their inventions and works of
authorship to their employers as a condition of employment." Hettinger, supra
note 26, at 47 (emphasis added).
29. Haskell v. Colebourne, 671 F.2d 1362 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that a
patent attorney does not necessarily prepare a patent application on behalf of
particular named persons, but on behalf of "a true inventive entity," and thus
draft application prepared on behalf of two inventors could stand as evidence of
conception of invention by one of the named inventors and two other subse-
quently named inventors).
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obscures any realization that inventors might require the
same sorts of economic incentives as companies in order to be
optimally productive.
B. Misdirection of Incentives to Innovate
Incentives to invent are misdirected both on a macro
scale, by societal institutions, and on a micro scale, by indi-
vidual entities that employ individuals with inventive capa-
bilities. The professed intent of U.S. patent laws has always
been to foster innovation by rewarding inventors for conceiv-
ing and reducing to practice novel, nonobvious innovations,3 °
but realization of this objective has been impeded by corpo-
rate usurpation of inventive bounty. The courts assist com-
panies in so doing by routinely upholding pre-invention as-
signment agreements, enabling employers to avoid the
allocation of patent rights between employee-inventor and in-
ventor employer dictated by the common law."' The failure of
state and federal legislatures to recognize and react to this
subversion of the goals of the patent system reflects their
tacit acceptance of current practices, as if the status quo re-
flects the proper order of things.
De facto governmental favoritism of investors, and the
apparent disinterest in the lot of actual inventors, gives com-
panies involved in inventive pursuits license to marginalize
employee-inventors and treat them as they do any other non-
management employee despite the uniqueness of their func-
tion. Corporations, in turn, individually misdirect innovative
incentives by failing to encourage and support inventive em-
ployees, by restricting the scope of innovation to market
driven target projects, and by failing to reward even those
employee-inventors who develop profitable, patentable
inventions.32
Other than a consuming love for the process of innova-
tion, there are few incentives to become an employee-inven-
tor. The summer after my second year in law school in the
late 1980s, I clerked in the immigration law department of a
large law firm, and found myself preparing temporary work
visas for foreign biologists, physical scientists and engineers,
most with Ph.D.'s and substantial "post doc" experience. Our
30. See Parker, supra note 17, at 603-04; Dratler, supra note 17, at 135.
31. See discussion infra Part II and note 18.
32. See infra Part II.A.2.
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clients were large corporate research and development insti-
tutions, who imported en masse highly credentialled scien-
tists for two to four year periods and paid them a pittance to
work long hours in for-profit laboratories.3 3 I had completed
only two years of law school, but was being paid in excess of a
thousand dollars per week to help clients arrange for the tem-
porary employment of very experienced and highly educated
scientists who labored fifty hours or more each week for sala-
ries as low as $16,000 per year, barely above the minimum
wage (if divided by the number of hours spent in the labora-
tory). America should not find it surprising that its children
would rather go into law than science or engineering.34
The foreign scientists and engineers involved gladly ac-
cepted meager wages in exchange for the opportunity to live
in the United States for a few years, enhance their resumes,
and perhaps make professional connections that would lead
to more lucrative employment later, either in this country or
abroad. The willingness of these noncitizens to be exploited
in this manner undoubtedly serves to depress wages for all
technology professionals, and to limit the employment oppor-
tunities available for American citizens or others with long
term commitments to the United States.35 Generally, it is
therefore always a "buyers market" for the "consumers" of
employee-inventors.
Almost every technologist (and in fact, almost every em-
ployee) of an American company involved in any sort of re-
33. Catherine Yang, Give Me Your Huddles ... High Tech Ph.D.'s, Bus.
WK., Nov. 6, 1995, at 161 ("By law, employers can't petition for either tempo-
rary or permanent immigration visas for foreign workers if they can find a qual-
ified U.S. citizen for the job. But it's widely known that employers often get
Labor Dept. [sic] approval by tailoring job descriptions to a particular foreign
candidate to make sure that no U.S. candidate can fill the slot.").
34. See Barbara Vobejda, Foreign Students Proliferate in Graduate Science
Programs: Shortage of American Expertise Foreseen, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1987,
at Al ("Across the country, the number of foreign graduate students enrolled in
all fields of science has grown dramatically. In engineering, mathematics and
computer sciences, more than 40 percent of graduate school enrollment is for-
eign..... 'We don't have too many foreign students. We have too few American
students,' said F. Karl Willenbrock, executive director of the American Society
for Engineering Education."). See, e.g., Joanne Miller, Minorities in Engineer-
ing: Numbers Paint a Diverse Picture, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, July
31, 1995, at 66 ("In 1993 there were 1,542 doctoral degrees in electrical engi-
neering by American universities, and only 560 (36.3 percent) were earned by
U.S. citizens or permanent residents.").
35. See generally Willam R. Greer, Foreign Students: Boon or a Threat?,
N.Y. TnMEs, Mar. 27, 1983, at 72; Yang, supra note 33, at 161.
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search is compelled to sign a pre-invention assignment agree-
ment as a condition of employment. 6 This insures that any
potentially lucrative invention devised by any employee re-
mains under the complete control of the employer and pre-
vents even the most brilliant and hard working, technologi-
cally proficient employee from securing even a shadow of the
bargaining power needed to leverage a share of profits from
any inventions, a good salary, or even a semblance of job se-
curity. In fact, any attempt by an employee-inventor to exert
any control over the terms of her employment, or over one
of her inventions may jeopardize her livelihood,38 and may
give her the reputation of "troublemaker" that will make ob-
taining a comparable position elsewhere difficult. In ex-
traordinary cases, an inventor who tries to retain ownership
of her invention may find herself in jail9.3  At present, the
best recourse for dissatisfied inventors is a change in career
path, and "the smart people... quit innovating and become
management types."4 0
Thus, the comparatively low wages and lack of attractive
job opportunities discourage American citizens from pursuing
research and development oriented employment that would
present opportunities to invent. Those who are willing to ig-
nore these hardships and enter technological fields cannot
36. See Hershovitz, supra note 8, at 197 n.53 ("In seeking to establish cer-
tainty in the employer-employee relationship and to obtain more protection
than the common law affords, employers frequently require employees to sign
'intellectual property agreements' as a condition of employment."). See also
Cherensky, supra note 17, at 599, 617; Parker, supra note 17, at 608.
37. Parker, supra note 17, at 608 ("Employees attempting to negotiate more
favorable assignment terms take a substantial risk with little hope of meaning-
ful gain. Further, inventors who demand unusual contract terms may reduce
their opportunities to change jobs because employers are wary of inventors who
try to obtain more than the traditional rewards for their inventions.").
38. Dratler, supra note 17, at 156-57. See Zlotnicki v. Harsco Corp., 672 F.
Supp. 161 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (termination of employee, who refused to sign pre-
invention assignment agreement until terms of agreement included his contin-
ued employment, was not wrongful after employee had applied for patent in his
own name in violation of the agreement, even though employee was terminated
only one month after signing said agreement).
39. A University of South Florida student disputing with corporation spon-
soring research in his laboratory over rights to invention that cleanses human
waste water was arrested for stealing his own laboratory notebooks, charged
and convicted of grand theft and misuse of trade secrets, and sent to chain gang
for violating his probation by filing for patents. William Booth, From University
Lab to Chain Gang, WASH. POST, June 7, 1996, at Al.
40. David Stipp, Inventors Are Seeking Bigger Share of Gains from Their
Successes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1982, at 1.
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count on financial rewards from even revolutionary labora-
tory achievements. 41 The current system is therefore para-
doxical: While investment in research and development by
technology oriented companies is encouraged, there are few
incentives for individual scientists to innovate. Conse-
quently, those who are predisposed to conceiving useful in-
ventions are discouraged from entering or remaining in in-
ventor positions.
The exact effect of this misdirection of inventive incen-
tives is impossible to quantify. There is no way to predict
who might have nurtured inventive talents in response to
monetary incentives, or what might have been invented had
an employee-inventor found herself in improved circum-
stances. There are widely disparate views about whether and
to what extent American innovation is declining or increas-
ing, and whether any change is absolute or comparative.42
41. See, e.g., PAUL RABINOW, MAKING PCR (1996) (describing how unusual it
was for scientists at Cetus Corporation to receive anything more than a token
one dollar payment for developing a patentable invention, in the context of dis-
cussing how unusual it was for Nobel laureate Kary Mullis to receive a $10,000
bonus for inventing the polymerase chain reaction, the patent rights to which
were later sold for $300 million).
42. But see Richard R. Nelson & Gavin Wright, The Rise and Fall of Ameri-
can Technological Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective, 30 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1931, 1955-56 (1992) ("Most analysts have noted that U.S.
patenting has shown an absolute decline since the late 1960s. That is so, but it
is also true of the major European countries and the U.S. rate has partially
recovered since 1980."); Steve Grossman, Better Friends than Foes: Growth of
U.S. Manufacturers Hinges on Partnerships with Foreign Competitors, KAN.
CITY Bus. J., Sept. 15, 1995, at 15 ("Eight of the top 11 organizations to receive
U.S. patents in 1994 were Japanese companies, according to the report. How-
ever, IBM was the No.1 recipient for the second consecutive year. The share of
U.S. patents going to American inventors in 1994 climbed to a record high in
the last decade to 55.1 percent, a marked improvement from the years between
1973 and 1988, which saw a steady decline in American inventor's share of U.S.
patent grants."); Short-Term Economic Indicators Show U.S. Leads Japan and
Germany, 2 TECH. TRANSFER WK. 31, Aug. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Nwltrs File ("The private, non-profit Council on Competitiveness re-
ports that, short term, the United States is doing well competing with other
industrialized countries. The group's 1995 Competitiveness Index says the
United States is among the top three in most short-term measures of economic
competitiveness, ahead of Germany and Japan, two technological powerhouses.
But long term indicators are worrisome, the report says, because American
companies are currently benefiting from fickle factors such as the weak Ameri-
can dollar, which helps exporters.... The report, compiled by business, labor
and academic leaders, urges government and industry not to forget that Ameri-
cas low savings rate, spiraling education costs and decreasing investment on
R&D are problems that need to be addressed if the nation is to remain competi-
tive."); Jerry Jackson, Commerce Transition Still Felt in Open Posts, ORLANDo
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There is general agreement, however, that technological in-
novation will play an increasingly important role in this
country's economy.43
III. A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF THE COMMON LAW
UPON INNOVATION WITH THE IMPACT OF PRE-
INVENTION ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENTS
Unless an employee was hired solely to invent a particu-
lar process or product at the specific direction of the employer
(the innovative outcome which will hereinafter be referred to
as a "linear" invention), employee-inventors retain ownership
of any patentable invention they develop,44 even if some of
the employer's time and materials were used during the in-
ventive process leading to an unexpected, "nonlinear" inven-
tion.45 If resources of the employer were used, the employer
retains a "shop right" in the invention that permits the
nonexclusive and nontransferable use of the invention, even
if the employee-inventor terminates her employment.46
Because valuable inventions had a way of turning up un-
expectedly, i.e. not at the specific direction of the employer,4 v
employers, "unwilling to rely on the uncertainty and per-
ceived equities of the common law,"48 began forcing their
technical employees to sign broad pre-invention assignment
SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 1996, at 10 ("The United States leads all countries in seeking
European patents, at nearly 33 percent, followed by Germany at 20 percent,
Japan at 17 percent, and France at 8 percent.").
43. See, e.g., George Leopold, California Maintains Job Lead, ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERING TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 71; Computers Will Be Crucial, ARiz. Bus.
GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 1997, at 14; Alan Hassenfeld, End the Pentagon Buying
Spree, J. COMM., Oct. 11, 1996, at 8A; Olaf de Senerport Domis & Jeffrey Kutler,
Reporters Notebook: Meeting Validates Treasury on Electronic Cash Issues, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 23, 1996, at 2.
44. Dratler, supra note 17, at 131. See Hershovitz, supra note 8, at 195-96.
45. See Van Slyke & Friedman, supra note 6, at 132 ("The basic starting
point in the law of employee/employer patent rights is the principle that the
inventor owns the patent rights even though the invention was conceived and/
or reduced to practice while the inventor was employed."). See also Parker,
supra note 17, at 606. But see Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d
403 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (employee not subject to pre-invention assignment agree-
ment who used employer's resources to conceive patentable invention and re-
duce it to practice had entered into an "implied-in-fact contract" to assign pat-
ent rights in invention to his employer).
46. Hershkovitz, supra note 8, at 195; Parker, supra note 17, at 607 (three
factors in determining employee ownership rights).
47. See Cherensky, supra note 17, at 613.
48. Id. at 617. See also Parker, supra note 17, at 609.
19971 EMPLOYEE-INVENTORS 687
agreements after World War II, when institutional research
and development underwent a great transformation,49 as did
the rest of society. Pre-invention assignment agreements
typically require employee-inventors to assign ownership of
any patented product or process invented during and after
the employee's tenure with the inventor employer. 50 Courts
generally hold such agreements to be valid and enforceable,
even though the employee-inventor usually receives no con-
sideration for signing such an agreement other than being
given a job, and neither party knows the subject or value of
the things being bargained for at the time this "mutual agree-
ment" is entered into,51 leading some to characterize pre-in-
vention assignment agreements as contracts of adhesion,
since prospective employees often cannot secure research ori-
ented employment at any corporation without signing one,
and others to characterize them as unconscionable.5 2 Courts
uphold pre-invention assignment agreements "unless the in-
ventor can show that the agreement is overbroad or that the
invention is outside the scope of the agreement in time or
subject matter."5 3 Universities and government operated re-
search entities require their potential inventors to sign or
otherwise submit to similar agreements.54
49. See Dratler, supra note 17, at 131.
50. Cherensky, supra note 17, at 619; Dratler, supra note 17, at 131;
Parker, supra note 17, at 608.
51. Cherensky, supra note 17, at 623. See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1927); Pisegna-Cook, supra note 18, at 173-76.
52. See Pisegna-Cook, supra note 18, at 171-77. See also Dratler, supra
note 17, at 141-48.
53. Dratler, supra note 17, at 148.
54. Sunil R. Kulkarni, All Professors Create Equally: Why Faculty Should
Have Complete Control Over the Intellectual Property Rights in Their Creations,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 235 (1995) ("The majority position among University pol-
icies . . .claim[s] substantial rights in patentable inventions. . . ."); Pisegna-
Cook, supra note 18, at 184 ("The federal government obtains the entire domes-
tic right, title and interest in an invention made by any federal government
employee if the invention is: (1) made during working hours, (2) made with gov-
ernment resources including money, facilities, materials, information or other
government employees' time, or (3) one that bears a direct relation to, or is
made in consequence of the official duties of the employee-inventor. Should the
government not plan to file a patent application or promote the invention's com-
mercialization, the government is required to allow the inventor to retain title.
If the contribution of the government is inadequate to warrant an assignment
of the invention under the three criteria, the government retains a shop right.
Compared with the common law, the federal employee loses ownership rights in
general inventions. However, the Technology Transfer Act of 1986 enacted
mandatory compensation for inventors employed by the federal government.
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According to at least two legal scholars,55 the judicial
system's tendency to "favor the capital contributor over the
labor contributor"5 6 by upholding pre-invention assignment
agreements is grounded in the erroneous belief that enforcing
these contracts will benefit the nation's economic and techno-
logical growth. Others have posited that patent assignment
agreements survive judicial scrutiny because such agree-
ments became popular "at a time when the gospel of freedom
of contract was preached in every pulpit;"" and that courts
"seem to ignore the employer's inherently stronger bargain-
ing position and superior legal knowledge." 9 Regardless of
the explanation, it is clear that the courts are likely to find
mainstream, pre-invention assignment agreements enforcea-
ble now and in the future.6 0
A. Pre-Invention Assignment Agreements Work in Concert
with Institutional Factors to Discourage Innovation
As explained above, employee-inventors sign pre-inven-
tion assignment agreements as prerequisites for simply re-
ceiving employment in a corporation, university or govern-
ment run laboratory. 61 Estimates of the number of American
patents awarded to employee-inventors range from 80% and
90%.62 In addition to depriving them of any right to share in
The act requires a minimum 15% share of any royalties or income received from
the government be given to the employee-inventor as compensation. In this
scheme, the employee benefits are relative to the success of the invention.").
55. Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, at 399.
56. Baker & Brunel argue that "[tihe unspoken, inchoate economic ration-
ale of protecting capital to promote economic growth" is based on weak judicial
economic development assumptions, and is detrimental to the American econ-
omy because courts fail to consider "promotion of innovation as a public policy
goal that would spur economic growth." Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, at 399,
402.
57. Id. at 399.
58. Dratler, supra note 17, at 142. See also Pisegna-Cook, supra note 18, at
173 ("Pre-invention assignment agreements are generally enforced on the basis
of freedom of contract principles.").
59. Hovell, supra note 17, at 876.
60. Interestingly, judges have declined to apply the same analysis to non-
competition agreements, which are not valid unless an employee receives com-
pensation beyond employment or retention of employment for executing such a
contract.
61. See discussion infra Part I.
62. See Hovell, supra note 17, at 863 ("Eighty-four percent of American pat-
ents are awarded to employed inventors.. . ." (citations omitted)); Parker, supra
note 17, at 604 ("80% to 90% of all inventions in the United States are made by
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the profits that their inventions might beget, pre-invention
assignment contracts render employee-inventors unable to
control the exploitation of their inventions, and strip them of
the ability to develop their inventions on their own, or to take
their inventions to other institutions more sympathetic to the
inventors' goals or more able to successfully launch and/or
support the actual inventions. Innovation is not simply in-
sufficiently fostered as a result of pre-invention assignment
agreements acting in tandem with other corporate practices;
it is actually repressed.
In 1979 one disgruntled physical scientist-inventor
turned lawyer, Jay Dratler, described two reasons why corpo-
rations in particular inadvertently or intentionally repress
innovation: Incentives for individuals to invent are inade-
quate, and corporate profit maximization may require inno-
vation to be discouraged or suppressed. 3 Though the focus of
this article is primarily on corporate inventor employers, the
operational dynamics of other research institutions, such as
universities and government run laboratories, repress inno-
vation in a similar fashion.64
employed inventors."); Pisegna-Cook, supra note 18, at 172 ("80% to 90% of all
patentable inventions are the result of employee-inventors.").
63. Dratler, supra note 17, at 174-77.
64. Most faculty members and university employees engaged in research
are compelled to adhere to academia's version of pre-invention assignment
agreement. See Kulkarni, supra note 54, at 235 ("The majority position among
University policies . . . claim[s] substantial rights in patentable inven-
tions.... ."). See also Sandip H. Patel, Graduate Students' Ownership and Attri-
bution Rights in Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481, 482 (1996) ("University
intellectual property policies have become standard for policies varying only
slightly in substance from one university to another. At their core, these poli-
cies provide guidelines that govern intellectual property ownership issues that
may arise in the context of university research. The policies seek to harmonize
these issues with the university mission to generate and disseminate informa-
tion for the benefit of the university and society as a whole. Faculty employ-
ment contracts often refer to these policies, noting that they are part of the
contractual agreement between the university and the professor. In this con-
text, the policies serve as pre-invention assignment agreements where faculty
agree to assign rights in inventions and creations conceived and reduced to
practice during the course of their employment in exchange for continued em-
ployment and a share in the royalties."); Dratler, supra note 17, at 148-54 (gov-
ernment researchers are similarly required to sign over the rights to inventions
not yet conceptualized); Pisegna-Cook, supra note 54.
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1. Inadequate Institutional Incentives to make
"Innovative Waves"
Entities such as corporations may offer monetary bo-
nuses and other corporate perks and "pats on the back" to
creative technical employees. However, these "incentives"
may pale in comparison to the rewards available for team-
work, cooperation, and attainment of production goals, objec-
tives which are hampered rather than fostered by even mod-
erate innovation: If the best interests of technical personnel,
supervisors and midlevel managers are served by following
the prevailing team ethic of large corporations, "that [team]
ethic will dilute or counteract the incentives for innovation
created by top management, and those incentives will be inef-
fective."65 Additionally, managers want to protect their
power by preserving the system that they have advanced
through.66 After succeeding with a given set of behaviors,
managers can be reluctant to deviate from entrenched com-
pany practices.67 Managers may also "hate being upstaged
by their creative subordinates,"68 and therefore may discour-
age innovative impulses in underlings.
2. Maximization of Institutional Profits May Require
Suppression of Inventions
By definition, innovation requires change, which even
moderately successful companies may resist for bottom line
reasons.69 A corporation that has substantially invested in
manufacturing facilities, personnel, advertising and market-
ing may recognize that it is more profitable to suppress inno-
vation than to retool and begin advertising and marketing a
new or substantially changed product, even when the new or
changed product is technologically superior. 70 Exploitation of
inventions that "compete" with a corporation's profitable
"status quo" product or process will therefore be delayed un-
less or until market forces make development and use of
these inventions more attractive.
65. Dratler, supra note 17, at 174.
66. Costello, supra note 2, at 60.
67. See id.
68. Stipp, supra note 40, at 24.
69. Corporations, like most institutions, resist unplanned change in gen-
eral. Dratler, supra note 17, at 179 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 174-76.
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Exploitation of inventions "outside the mainstream of the
corporation's business activity" might be suppressed out of in-
advertence or neglect, especially if management does not rec-
ognize the importance of the invention or its potential value
to other industries. A company would be understandably re-
luctant to devote significant resources to the development of
inventions of uncertain applicability or worth, and an individ-
ual inventor would be understandably unlikely to invest her
own time to pursuits that will not be appreciated by her
employer. 7 '
One observer carefully pointed out that disincentives to
innovate arise not from any evil intent on the part of corpora-
tions, but from "the very nature of the corporate enter-
prise."72 According to this view, "a corporation is only a sub-
unit of the larger society, and each corporation has its own
financial difficulties, limited resources, and industrial and
commercial goals." 73 Because "both patentable and unpat-
entable innovation occur in a random and haphazard way," it
is too much to expect that the particular corporation in which
a given innovation was first conceived will nurture it in a
manner calculated to maximize the welfare of the larger
society."74
Others are less charitable when assessing institutional
actions and motives in the context of their behavior toward
employee-inventors. Two legal scholars considering the mis-
treatment of employee-inventors sardonically point out near
the conclusion of their article (discussed in detail below) that
"employers present through their remarkable ability to mis-
treat employed inventors many tempting cases" which illus-
trate the need for changes,75 in the way employee-inventors
are treated by their employing corporations and the courts.76
While it is unclear from just the press coverage and re-
ported court opinions exactly what transpired in the cases
referenced below, a survey of recent litigation (past and pend-
ing) at least demonstrates the range of challenges faced by




74. Id. at 177.
75. See Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, at 427.
76. See supra note 130.
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suits over patent rights. In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
Lieberam,7 the Eleventh Circuit summarily ruled for Geor-
gia-Pacific in a dispute over patent ownership where the dis-
puted invention was developed prior to the signing of a pre-
invention assignment agreement by Mr. Lieberam, the em-
ployee-inventor. Similarly, in Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki78 the
Third Circuit affirmed a declaratory judgment that an inven-
tor employer owned a patent because the scope of the pre-
invention assignment agreement signed by the employee-in-
ventor reached inventions conceived before such an agree-
ment was signed. The court also found that where keeping
his job was all the employee received in exchange for signing
a pre-invention assignment agreement after he conceived a
valuable invention, continued employment of one month
(before he was fired) was adequate consideration for his pat-
ent assignment, and that even given the obvious pressure the
employee was under, he did not sign the disputed patent as-
signment agreement under duress.
In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, though not hired to
invent, an employee named Ciavatta submitted thirteen pat-
ent disclosure forms to upper management, which were ig-
nored, so he terminated his employment. Nine months after
changing jobs, he applied for a patent, and was sued by for-
mer employer for assignment of rights to his patent pursuant
to a "trailer clause" contained in pre-invention assignment
agreement.
In MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc.,8° the company
shut down an entire plant and terminated several employees,
and these now unemployed individuals formed their own
software company, which they called Basis, Inc. MAI Basic
Four, Inc. then sued its former employees, claiming that the
product Basis, Inc. was marketing had been developed during
their employment with MAI Basic Four or within 90 days of
their termination, and was therefore subject to patent-
waiver, confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements they
had been required to sign as a condition of employment.
Not all employee-inventors who feel mistreated resort to
the courts. One employee-inventor of a large corporation who
77. 959 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1992).
78. 779 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1985).
79. 542 A.2d 879 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1988).
80. 880 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1989).
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was a co-inventor of an anti-tuberculosis drug, reports not be-
ing rewarded at all, though the drug brought American Cyan-
amid $50 million a year in sales."1 He stayed with the com-
pany despite this mistreatment because at age fifty-five he
didn't feel he had alternative employment prospects.8 2 In
1982, when American Cyanimid was reaping $30 million in
sales for a herbicide that killed wild oats, it laid off the inven-
tor of the herbicide as a cost cutting measure.8 3
Lockheed Corporation, which championed an award pro-
gram to stimulate creativity, gave $20,000 to the inventor of
a $50 million invention, and initially, nothing to the co-inven-
tors of a $330 million invention. After they complained, each
co-inventor received an award of $1,250.84 They eventually
brought this dispute into the judicial arena. 5 Similarly, Dr.
Daniel Bradley filed suit against biotech giant Chiron Corpo-
ration in January of 1995 alleging that he was "deliberately
and unlawfully excluded from patent rights obtained by the
company," after "Chiron systematically diminished his role
on the discovery [of the hepatitis C test] in order to claim a
monopoly in the marketplace."86
Inventors in academia who seek to retain control of their
patentable inventions can face similar obstacles. For exam-
ple, a dispute over patent ownership between the University
of Pennsylvania and a part time faculty member who in-
vented Retin-A, a treatment for both acne and wrinkles, led
the University of Pennsylvania to sue one of its distinguished
faculty members, even though he had never signed a pre-in-
vention assignment agreement, and had voluntarily donated
to the University hundreds of thousands of dollars that he
received as royalty payments after licensing his invention. 7
Not surprisingly, the government also appears ready to
exploit individual inventors whenever the opportunity arises.
Since promulgation of Executive Order 10096 by President
Truman in 1950 (around the time that corporations began re-
81. Stipp, supra note 40, at 24.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1.
84. Id. at 24.
85. Subsequent litigation brought these inventors judicially allocated
awards of $2.6 million. Id.
86. Plaintiffs Opening Brief, Bradley v. Chiron Corp., No. 96-1516, 1996
U.S. App. Lexis 31136 (Nov. 13, 1996).
87. University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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quiring employee-inventors to sign pre-invention assignment
agreements) the government is the presumptive owner of any
patented invention developed by a government employee."8
Government agencies are free to license government em-
ployee originated patents to private industry, 9 but even with
these broad powers Uncle Sam has been known to overreach.
In Lariscey v. United States90 a prisoner was found to have
intellectual property rights in an invention he developed dur-
ing incarceration. The appropriation of this invention by a
government corporation without just compensation was
found to be an unconstitutional taking after the invention
was exploited without any credit or compensation given to
Lariscey, who risked retaliation from prison officials when he
contested the usurpation of his invention.
IV. GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO STIMULATE INNOVATION
ARE GENERALLY AIMED AT INVESTORS
A. The Federal Circuit
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit, patents
were unlikely to be found valid by the federal courts in the
context of an infringement action or declaratory judgment on
validity.91 This reluctance of the courts to uphold patent va-
lidity and protect patent rights was believed to repress incen-
tives to innovate, and the Federal Circuit was established in
part to stimulate research and development among compa-
nies in the United States.92
88. Dratler, supra note 17, at 151; Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th
Cir. 1976) (holding constitutional an Executive Order giving U.S. Government
presumptive ownership of inventions patented by government employees).
89. Dratler, supra note 17, at 152.
90. 949 F.2d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
91. See Gerald Sobel, Article, The Court of Appeals For the Federal Circuit:
A Fifth Anniversary Look at Its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U.
L. REV. 1087, 1091-93 (1988).
92. See J. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Ju-
dicial Activism?, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 683 (1993).
[The controlling reason for establishment of the Federal Circuit
was] the forceful concern of the nation's technological leadership about
the effect on industrial innovation of judge-made patent law.... The
interest of industry was the restoration of the patent system's constitu-
tional and statutory incentive to promote technological progress. That
incentive had been diminished by the inconsistencies of judge-made




Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman has written that
the Federal Circuit fosters innovation by simply enhancing
the predictability of the outcome of patent litigation through
implementation of consistent standards and a reasonable in-
terpretation of the patent laws.9 3 Alternatively, legal scholar
Gerald Sobel characterizes the Federal Circuit as philosoph-
ically disposed to upholding patent validity,94 and attributes
the Federal Circuit's positive impact on innovation to its pat-
ent friendly jurisprudence. 95
.Establishment of the Federal Circuit may have increased
inventive productivity to some degree by increasing "predict-
ability,"96 or simply by being "patent friendly,"97 but the
magnitude of the effect of this predictability and/or patent
friendliness on any increase in technological innovations in
this country is not clear.98 The jurisprudence of the Federal
The idea was ambitious yet simple: the idea that consistent appli-
cation of the law, achieved by eliminating the opportunity for forum-
shopping, would have a direct and salutary effect on industrial innova-
tion, and thereby on the nation's technological strength and interna-
tional competitiveness. Patent rights are a factor in much of the re-
search, investment, and commercial risk-taking that comprise
industrial innovation; yet the marked variations among judicial patent
decisions in the regional circuits suggested to the technology commu-
nity that this aspect was not always well understood.
Id. at 685.
93. Id. at 687-88.
94. See Sobel, supra note 91, at 1090-105.
95. The changes brought about by the Federal Circuit have
profound practical effects not only in patent infringement litigation,
but also in the design of new products and in licensing negotiations.
Although the court has preserved defenses to infringement and en-
hanced some of them, the overriding change has been on the validity
issue. The increased likelihood of success on the critical issue of valid-
ity has transformed the outlook in patent infringement litigation for
patentees. The likelihood of suits for infringement is greater, and the
likelihood and authority with which patentees will make threats of suit
is correspondingly greater.
Sobel, supra note 91, at 1090.
96. The Federal Circuit applies a more consistent interpretation of the
standards of patentability, leading to a "greatly enhanced degree of predictabil-
ity of the outcome of patent litigation" which may encourage contestants to
avoid litigation. See Newman, supra note 92, at 687-88.
97. "The net effect of the Federal Circuit's work.., has been to strengthen
the incentive to innovate." Sobel, supra note 91, at 1092.
98. The Federal Circuit was born in the recessive economic period
of the late 1970s, and was charged with the expectation that correct
and wise judicial application of patent law would support technological
innovation, as the law was intended to do, thereby contributing to capi-
tal formation and the industrial activity that is the foundation of our
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Circuit may have led to increased investment in research and
development, which may have in turn produced more patent-
able inventions, but no one has yet been able to demonstrate
or quantify this effect. What is apparent is that improving
the "predictability of patentability" failed to directly aim in-
centives to innovate where they are most needed, at the indi-
vidual inventor.
B. Federal Legislation
Prior to establishment of the Federal Circuit, several
"pro-inventor" pieces of legislation were introduced into Con-
gress, but all died in committee, including the Moss Bill of
196999 (which was reintroduced four times throughout the
1970s without success), the Hart-Owens Bill of 1973100 and
the Kastenmeier Bills of 1 9 8 2 .101 Each of these proposed fed-
eral statutes would have required the government to deter-
mine what compensation an employee-inventor would receive
from the exploitation of a patented invention, 10 2 which un-
doubtedly would have introduced a bureaucratic entity into
the process which would be subject to political pressure. Leg-
islative intervention into the relationship between employers
and employee-inventors is not likely to benefit employee-in-
ventors when the majority of Congress is markedly pro-em-
ployer, even assuming that this or any Congress would pass
such legislation in the first place, which is empirically
unlikely. 103
nation's economic and political strength. It is not easy to measure the
impact of this change in judicial structure, and accompanying changes
in jurisprudence, on industrial innovation. I have seen no definitive
economic study, and perhaps none is possible, for the nation's economy
is not a controlled experiment.
Newman, supra note 92, at 686. But see Sobel, supra note 91, at 1091-92:
The patent system stimulates invention and commercialization by
providing a seventeen-year exclusive right to the invention. This ex-
clusive right can be exploited to provide financial rewards to patent
owners and investors who are able to successfully commercialize their
inventions. The net effect of the Federal Circuit's work, therefore, has
been to strengthen the incentive to innovate.
99. H.R. 15512, 91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in 116 Cong. Rec. 744 (1970),
reintroduced as HR 1483, 92d Cong. (1971).
100. S. 1321, 93d Cong. (1973), reprinted in 119 Cong. Rec. 9102 (1973), and
H.R. 7111, 93d Cong. (1973).
101. H.R. 4732, 97th Cong. (1981), and H.R. 6635, 97th Cong. (1982).
102. See Hovell, supra note 17, at 883-88.




A. Allocation of Patent Ownership Rights Between
Employee-Inventors and Inventor Employers Based
on the Proportional Contribution of Each to
the Development of the Invention
In 1979, physical scientist-turned-lawyer Jay Dratler, Jr.
called for "a free marketplace for new ideas, in which various
individuals and corporations can bid for the right to develop
and exploit an innovation - at any stage of its development
- to the best of their abilities and the fullest extent of their
resources."' °4 He argued that even if an innovation could po-
tentially render a corporation's assembly line obsolete, that
corporation should not be allowed to suppress the inven-
tion.10 5 Instead, he advocated allowing another corporation
to exploit the unwanted invention, thereby permitting the
purchasing public to decide, "by continuing to purchase the
old (and presumably cheaper) product rather than switching
to the more desirable new one, or vice versa, whether contin-
ued operation of the expensive but outmoded assembly line
maximizes the welfare of society as a whole."'0 6 Similarly, he
asserted that "if an innovation lies outside the mainstream of
expertise in the corporation which gave it birth, other indi-
viduals and corporations should have an opportunity to nur-
ture it to its full stature and importance in the larger indus-
trial community."10 7 Therefore, according to Dratler's
express analysis "[piroductive innovation will in general be
maximized only if each new idea is put up for sale to the high-
est bidder (presumably the one who can use it most effi-
ciently), without requiring that bidder to pay for internal in-
efficiencies in the corporation in which the idea happens to
have been conceived."'0
Dratler's recommendation for achieving this "free market
place of ideas" is to divide patent ownership rights between
the inventor and her employer, allocating these rights based
on the "extraordinary effort [in overcoming human resistance
to new ideas] which each of the participants contributes to its
104. Dratler, supra note 17, at 177.
105. Id. at 177-78.
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part of the process of innovation,"10 9 a weighing of "the rela-
tive contributions of the inventor, on the one hand, and the
supervisors and middle management, on the other."110 He
proposed measuring each contribution not against an abso-
lute standard, but rather "against the contributions expected
of each of the parties in the ordinary course of research and
development.""' Initially, Dratler would have the employer
and inventor privately bargain over the allocation of rights in
an invention, with "compulsory arbitration subject to a statu-
tory standard" as a "backstop" if the parties could not reach
agreement. 112
109. Id. at 191.
110. Dratler, supra note 17, at 191.
111. Id. at 192.
112. A system of bargaining and arbitration might work as follows.
After making an invention, an employee would apply for a patent in his
own name. He would ordinarily fund patent prosecution out of his own
pocket, but if the employer took a special interest in the invention, the
employer might be allowed to contribute the time of its own attorneys,
or fees for outside counsel, subject to the inventor's approval. If the
employer were ultimately denied rights in the invention by arbitration,
its expenses for patent prosecution would be reimbursed from the in-
ventor's royalties.
Once a patent issued [sic], the employee could begin negotiations
with his employer and with other firms for exclusive licensing. Negoti-
ations with the employer would be subject to the statutory standard, as
would subsequent arbitration: that ownership should be divided ac-
cording to the relative effort of the parties, above and beyond the ordi-
nary, in overcoming human resistance to new ideas. There would,
however, be a presumption of inventor ownership, so that the employer
would be inclined to make reasonable offers for patent rights. Since
the inventor would know that the employer's statutory share in the
invention could be enforced by arbitration, he would also be
reasonable.
In the absence of agreement, either the inventor or the employer
could demand compulsory arbitration by a board consisting of three
arbitrators, one chosen by each of the two parties and the third chosen
by agreement between the first two. The employee could not license
the invention to a third party until the conclusion of arbitration.
The arbitration panel would determine the relative share of rights
in the patent according to the statutory standard, subject to the pre-
sumption of inventor ownership. If the employer were the only bidder
for the invention, the panel would determine reasonable terms for li-
censing, whether exclusive or nonexclusive, taking into account the
statutory standard and estimates of the utility and value of the inven-
tion. If the employee had offers from third parties for rights in the
invention, the panel would decide whether to allow him to accept any
such offer in preference to the employer's best offer. If a license to a
third party were allowed, the panel would decide what share of the
royalties the employer should receive.
EMPLOYEE-INVENTORS
2. Critique of Dratler's Proposal
According to Dratler, the system he suggested "would
produce incentives for inventors by prohibiting advance as-
signment of patent rights and giving the inventor a share of
those rights proportional to his extraordinary effort in over-
coming resistance to his new idea," but not "at the expense of
the corporation, which would retain a share of the patent
rights proportional to the extraordinary inventive efforts of
its supervisory and management personnel."
113
Dratler claimed quite forcefully that the "extraordinary
effort in overcoming human resistance to new ideas" stan-
dard "is no more unfathomable than others regularly applied
under common and statutory law" and can be successfully ap-
plied when the factfinder has an "inherent understanding of
what is ordinary and what is not.., based both upon knowl-
edge of the particular situation at issue and upon a general
reservoir of knowledge of similar situations."" 4 Even assum-
ing that this standard is, as Dratler asserted, no more diffi-
cult to apply than the test for negligence in a medical mal-
practice case or a determination of "nonobviousness" in a
patent case, he failed to acknowledge that power balance dif-
ferentials provide employers with overwhelming leverage.
If an inventor wants to keep her job, she is apt to capitu-
late to the desires of her employer during the course of the
initial "private bargaining," allowing the employer to over-
state its contribution to the invention, and acquire a larger
share of the patent rights than it is entitled to. Alternatively,
if she is confident of both the value of her invention and her
ability to prove that she has invested "extraordinary effort" in
its conception and development (and can afford competent
legal counsel) the employee-inventor may assume a more ag-
gressive bargaining posture. However, she would risk anger-
ing the management of the corporation for which she works,
which could jeopardize her job, and make her highly unat-
tractive to other prospective employers. If her invention is
valuable enough and she triumphs during the bargaining
process and any subsequent compulsory arbitration, licensing
her invention may render her financially secure despite likely
Id. at 199-200.
113. Id. at 202.
114. Id. at 194.
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unemployment, but without a laboratory she is unlikely to
spawn any future inventions, to the detriment of society, and
may be thereafter personally frustrated and unfulfilled.
A more fundamental problem with this approach is that,
while it has the commendable effect of rewarding maverick
inventors who are not afraid to take risks and buck the sys-
tem, it has the unfortunate effect of punishing inventors who
are lucky enough to work in healthy, supportive environ-
ments. An inventor who toils beneath "supervisors and mid-
dle-level managers ... [who show] initiative and alacrity at
every step" of the invention's development pays dearly for the
beneficence and foresight of her employer, as under Dratler's
analysis, where management is supportive and helpful dur-
ing the innovative process, "the employer clearly should get
most of the patent rights."115
Inventors, therefore, have financial and "control" incen-
tives NOT to work well with others on the job. In order to
position themselves for maximum control of and return from
their inventions, inventors would need to hide things from
their employers and do everything possible to undermine the
value and productiveness of any assistance provided by su-
pervisors and managers. This is not a recipe for either en-
couraging innovation or fostering industrial peace.
B. Modification of the "Shop Rights" Doctrine and
Establishment of a Minimum Royalty Payment for
Employee Inventors
Alternatively, legal scholars Mark B. Baker and Andre J.
Brunel have proposed judicial alteration of the currently ex-
isting "shop rights" doctrine which would benefit employee-
inventors who are not pre-invention assignment agreement
signatories, and mandatory minimum royalties for employee-
inventors who are bound by such contracts. Baker and
Brunel are very critical of the common law jurisprudence con-
cerning the rights of employee-inventors, asserting that
judges are pro-employer and prefer to favor capital contribut-
ing parties over employee-inventors based on the erroneous
assumption that this promotes economic development.1 '
115. Id. at 192.
116. Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, at 401.
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The co-authors take a two-pronged approach to securing
"rough justice for the employed inventor," by proposing
changes in the common law of shop rights, and changes in the
contract analysis of typical pre-invention assignment agree-
ments. 1 17 They acknowledge that altering the common law
will not affect inventors who have signed pre-invention agree-
ments with their employers, but argue that such changes will
benefit both "informal employee inventors" who were not
hired to invent but did anyway, and employees who were not
originally hired to invent but later take on inventive respon-
sibilities on the job, assuming that these two categories of
workers were not already required to sign pre-invention as-
signment agreements."18
Baker and Brunel suggest that the current policy of
granting an employer shop rights when an employee inventor
has made "substantial use of the employer's facilities, materi-
als or time" should be changed to exclude any use of the em-
ployer's shop, because, assuming the shop would not other-
wise have been used, the employer is not harmed or
inconvenienced, and "a more effective use of this nation's ex-
isting industrial facilities" is encouraged." 9 With respect to
use of the employer's materials, Baker and Brunel would give
the employee-inventor the option of avoiding a dedication of
shop rights to her employer by repaying the employee for the
materials used.1
20
Under the two scholars' reforms, where use of an em-
ployer's materials was minor or the employer was reimbursed
as described above, the employer would acquire shop rights in
an invention only where the invention was developed using
substantial amounts of time that the employee should have
been dedicating to the employer, and/or the time of other em-
ployees. Baker and Brunel would not allow an employee to
avoid a dedication of "shop rights" by reimbursing the em-
ployer for the cost of the time spent on the invention "taken"
from the employer based on distinctions the authors make be-
tween materials and time. According to Baker and Brunel
"the measurement of the value of the employee time used to
aid the inventor would be unwieldy and impractical for the
117. Id. at 419-27.
118. Id. at 419.
119. Id. 419-20.
120. Id. at 420.
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parties and the courts" if other workers were salaried rather
than paid on an hourly basis.121 They also argued that it
would be "unfair to the employer to simply calculate damages
based on the wages of the employees because the missed op-
portunities resulting from his employees working on a project
he did not authorize cannot really be compensated in dam-
ages."122 It is therefore only with respect to materials and
supplies, which are fungible and have easily assessed values,
and the usurpation of which can be characterized as an incon-
venience, that Baker and Brunel believe an employer can be
financially compensated out of a shop right. 123
This overall proposal also encompasses a restructuring of
the shop right such that rather than existing for the life of
the patent, employers would retain shop rights to the inven-
tion only as long as employee-inventors remained in their em-
ploy, thereby enhancing the bargaining power of the em-
ployee-inventor and making it more likely that the employer
will "adequately" compensate the employee for her invention,
because if the employer does not, the employee can leave and
take her invention with her.124 According to Baker and
Brunel, "[tihe employee, if his invention has real value, will
be compensated for his invention because the employee's po-
tential employers must bid among themselves for the right to
use the invention by hiring the employee at an above market
salary. The employee, on the other hand, may go it alone and
start his own company... [and be] fully compensated for his
121. Id.
122. Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, at 420.
123. Id.
124. Restructuring the duration of the shop right to last only for the
time that the employee remains working for the employer will raise the
traditional concern of business lawyers about the potential for em-
ployee economic extortion. Employees may threaten to leave their em-
ployer after the employer has spent significant sums on a project in-
volving the employee's invention. This is a risk that the employer
should accept if he does not take measures to retain the employee. The
employer can realistically be assumed to recognize the risk of spending
such sums without first securing the right to continue using the inven-
tion after the employee no longer works for the employer. Through ex-
press terms in a new employment contract, with higher wages or a pro-
motion for the employed inventor, the employer could protect his right
to continue using the invention for the duration of the patent if the
employee should breach. If the employer proceeds without such pre-





new invention by whatever he earns as the owner of his new
company."125
Baker and Brunel argue that only by making these
changes in the common law shop rights doctrine can bargain-
ing strength be equalized between employers and employees
who were not hired to invent. 126 They would also impose a
notification requirement, to insure that employee inventors
understand their ownership rights in their inventions before
they begin bargaining over allocation of these rights with
their employer. 12
7
The second and more significant prong of their approach
is what Baker and Brunel entitled "Specific Recommenda-
tions to Change the Contract Analysis of Typical Pre-inven-
tion Assignment Agreements to Reflect a New Public Policy
Concern for Innovation."1 28  Their first recommendation is
that courts use the quantum meruit doctrine to establish
minimum royalties that an employer must pay an employee-
inventor bound by a pre-invention assignment agreement, to
increase the correlation between an employee's inventive pro-
ductivity and her pay.'29 Such minimum royalties would
either replace or supplement the voluntary salary increases,
bonuses and promotions that employers currently use to com-
pensate employee inventors when they so choose.' 3 °
125. Id. at 421.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, at 423.
129. Id. at 423-25.
130. Id. at 423.
Courts could, under the doctrine of quantum meruit reasonably
require the employer to pay the employee minimum royalties, for ex-
ample, two percent, of the profit or savings to the employer attributa-
ble to the invention. Such a requirement provides five substantial ad-
vantages. First and foremost, it exemplifies in concrete form the
economic assumption that innovation is the most significant factor in
economic growth. The original connection made by the founding fa-
thers, between an employee's labor in creating new technology and his
compensation through the ability to charge monopoly prices with a pat-
ent, would be restored. The intelligent assumption of the founding fa-
thers that reorganizing incentives so that private incentives corre-
sponded with the public good would also once again be in place.
Second, this proposal would provide employees with rough justice
because a sense of proportion would once again exist between the con-
tribution of the employee and his compensation. Deeply bitter feelings
about the lot of employed inventors will improve and thus allow those
who wish to remain inventors to remain inventors. The significantly
better managerial pay encourages employed inventors to become man-
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Baker and Brunel would have the Courts find pre-inven-
tion assignment agreements that are not limited to reason-
able terms wholly unenforceable as unconscionable adhesion
contracts. 131 Reasonable terms would be narrowly defined,
such that the scope of the employer's business would be lim-
ited to the scope of business of the smallest bureaucratic unit
that employed the employee, and only inventions that related
to an employer's products could be covered, rather than "all
inventions of the employee" approach currently promulgated
agers and thus hinders economic growth by shrinking the pool of pres-
ent inventors. "The smart people.., quit innovating and become man-
agement types." The present economic reward system also limits the
potential pool of future investors in an unexpected and very significant
way. "For all practical purposes - [employees hired to invent] are
very much like the medieval serfs. I have seen to it my two children
went into other professions.
Third, this compensation plan is simple. Unlike the bureaucratic
Moss-Kastenmeier plan modeled after West Germany's system, this
proposal would only become relevant in the one in one hundred patents
that are economically viable and does not create an extra layer of bu-
reaucracy when it does come into play. The Moss-Kastenmeier propo-
sal applied to all inventions that an employer sought to patent, regard-
less of economic worth, for example, defensive patents were included
under the Moss-Kastenmeier bill. The Moss-Kastenmeier bill did not
recognize a significant cultural difference between West Germans and
Americans. West German culture typically responds to social issues
with very bureaucratic answers; American culture typically demands a
direct answer to a social dilemma. Providing a minimum royalty pay-
ment would be such a direct answer, albeit not as refined as a bureau-
cratic solution might present.
Fourth, this proposal would only be a minimum and would leave
the parties to negotiate on their own the exact structure and level of
the payments.
Finally, this proposal would not require employers to assess in ad-
vance the merit of a new invention in order [to] see whether it is worth
paying the employee some lump sum prior to its use. Fixing the pay-
ment to the employee as a percentage of the royalties eliminates the
need for the employer to estimate what is sometimes impossible and
usually difficult to estimate: the value of an invention before it is
tested in the market.
Id. at 424-25.
131. Instead of following the unstated, and unsubstantiated, prem-
ise that the protection of capital is the best way to encourage economic
growth, courts should explicitly consider the promotion of innovation
as a more significant way of increasing economic growth. The present
common law governing the rights of employed inventors should be re-
structured to eliminate the pro-employer bias. As a matter of public
policy, pre-invention agreements that seek to assign rights to the em-




by most employers in their pre-invention assignment
agreements. 132
1. Critique of Barker and Brunel's Proposals
Although Baker and Brunel's article is interesting and
provocative, their proposed alterations to the "shop rights"
doctrine are too extreme, while their recommendations for
improving the situation of employee-inventors subject to pre-
employment assignment agreements fail to increase incen-
tives to innovate as fully as possible.
As Baker and Brunel concede, alteration of the "shop
rights" doctrine will effect very few employee-inventors, those
who obtain employment without signing pre-invention as-
signment agreements, probably because at the time they are
hired there is no expectation that they will be inventive.
Baker and Brunel would make the ownership rights that
these individuals retain in their inventions contingent upon
the amount and variety of the employer's resources used dur-
ing the inventive process; employee-inventors could avoid
dedicating shop rights to an employer by compensating the
employer for any materials used, but are compelled to grant
shop rights where labor has been "taken" from the em-
ployer. 133 There would therefore be a strong incentive for an
employee inventor to use as few of the employer's resources
as possible when developing a patentable invention, in order
to minimize any financial reimbursals and circumvent
"mandatory" shop rights. Incentives to eschew the tools,
materials, and machinery one is most comfortable using, and
to avoid the assistance or feedback of colleagues, hardly seem
to foster innovation in an efficient and maximally productive
manner.
Moreover, in any dispute over the quantity of the em-
ployer' s resource contributions, or whether any of the em-
ployer's time was taken, one wonders how many employee-
inventors would be financially and emotionally capable of hir-
ing legal counsel and taking on the employer and the em-
ployer's attorneys. The employee would undoubtedly be fired
immediately, but the employee's invention could be months
or years away from profitability, assuming she was even able
132. Id. at 420.
133. Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, at 420.
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to license it at all, given that the exclusivity of the license
would be in question during the pendency of the litigation.
Given the circumstances of her termination, she may have
difficulty securing alternate employment while simultane-
ously incurring what are apt to be significant legal expenses.
Considering the stakes for the corporate employer, which will
be left with nothing if not held to be entitled to shop rights,
one might reasonably expect a dispute (and subsequent
scorched earth litigation) to arise over every potentially prof-
itable patented invention developed by its employees.
The concept of requiring quantum meruit derived mini-
mum royalty payments to employee-inventors, thereby insur-
ing that they are compensated for their inventions roughly
proportionately to the market value of what they have cre-
ated, is appealing. However, the problem with this approach
is the feasibility of persuading judges, with their entrenched
pro-capital (and therefore pro-employer) biases,1 3 4 to start
making such awards. Baker and Brunel's article, published
five years ago, was obviously not enough of a push, and it is
not clear who or what employee-inventor aligned organiza-
tion might be well organized and powerful enough to success-
fully advocate such a change in the face of well funded corpo-
rate opposition. As discussed above, federal legislation
mandating possible minimum royalties to employee-inven-
tors did not even make it out of committee, 135 and that was
when Democrats, who are generally more sympathetic to la-
bor interests than Republicans, held a majority in both
houses of Congress.
C. Disaggregation of Patent Rights such that
Employee-Inventors Retain a Non-Exclusive,
Non-Transferable Right to Practice their
Inventions (A "Reverse Shop Right")
Another technologist who left the laboratory to go to law
school, Steven Cherensky, also recognized that employee-in-
ventors are often bereft of any real incentive to innovate.
136
He considers "pre-inventions" (essentially inventions that
have not yet been conceived of) entities, and argues that both
employee-inventors and employers have significant, cogniza-
134. Id. at 406.
135. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
136. Cherensky, supra note 17, at 593.
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ble proprietary interests in pre-inventions. 137 In his
thougtful and philosophically driven article, appropriately ti-
tled A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Pre-In-
vention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood,
he presents an alternative property approach for the resolu-
tion of pre-invention assignment disputes which is labelled
"personhood theory."138  According to Cherensky,
"[plersonhood theory suggests that certain rights of em-
ployee-inventors in their inventions be non-appropriable
when those rights are justifiably constitutive of the inventor's
personhood." 139  The first consequence of applying per-
sonhood theory to pre-invention assignment agreements is
that an employee-inventor retains rights in her invention
"only when she can demonstrate a justifiable personhood in-
terest in the invention." 140 Otherwise the employer "retain [s]
all interests in the invention, including credit as the inventor-
entity." 4 ' Second, "when the employee-inventor can demon-
strate a justifiable personhood interest in her invention, this
personhood interest should be protected by removing the pro-
tected interest from the market. " 142  A determination of
137. Id.
138. The personhood theory of property focuses on the relationship
between property and personality. Property, it is argued, is justified
because it is conducive, perhaps necessary, to the development of per-
sonality. Personality has many meanings. For example, personality
can refer to the 'moral and political personhood,' 'awareness of individ-
uating characteristics,' or 'the desirable integration of the self's
thoughts and attitudes.' Every meaning of personality contains some
notion of the person as an autonomous, moral, individuated agent.
Although different formulations of personhood theory emphasize dif-
ferent meanings of personality, elements of each of these meanings are
always present.
Personhood theory has been characterized here as an alternative
theory of property in the sense that the analysis is, to some extent,
outside the mainstream of judicial, if not philosophic, thought. How-
ever, personhood theories of property are by no means new. Elements
of a personhood theory of property are evident in the works of Plato
and Aristotle, although personhood theory as we understand it today
was first hinted at in the work of Kant in the eighteenth century.
Kant, however, was working within a natural rights framework, and
thus Kantian personhood is really more a variant of traditional prop-
erty theory than an alternative theory.
Id. at 642 (citing STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 18-19 (1990)).
139. Id at 601.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Cherensky, supra note 17, at 601.
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whether an inventor is in possession of these "personhood in-
terests" is, therefore, critical to apportioning patent owner-
ship rights between employee-inventors and their employers.
"Personhood interests," as described by Cherensky, in-
clude an inventor's desire to remain connected to her inven-
tive works.' 4 3 He points out that "under the Patent Code, ap-
plications must be made by human inventors, not their
corporate assignees," and that patent applications "must in-
clude an oath by the human inventor."144 Therefore, he as-
serts, "patent law ... recognizes the personhood interests of
inventors in two ways: by requiring the identification of the
human creators responsible for the invention on the patent
application, and by notation of the inventor on the issued pat-
ent," a "non-transferable, non-assignable, market-inalienable
inventorship identification" which "protect[s]... a personhood
interest-the association of the person with her invention."145
Cherensky proposes that personhood interests are pres-
ent only in "employee pre-inventions ,"'14 6-those innovations
that employees might develop in the future. He distinguishes
employee pre-inventions from other inventions and pre-in-
ventions because "an employee-inventor's 'decision' to alien-
ate her pre-inventions is particularly suspect" because "the
employee-inventor must decide to alienate her interests
before she even conceives of the invention and before she has
invested any personality."147 Therefore, "the employee-in-
ventor has no meaningful choice but to accept the terms of-
fered by the employer if she wishes to develop her personhood
by participating in the inventive process, given that large
firms dominate access to necessary resources and
opportunities." 48
The changes in the patent law that Cherensky advocates
to "overcome its current shortcomings in protecting the per-
sonhood interests of employee-inventors" 49 include recogni-
tion of corporate inventorship in "pre-inventions without jus-
tifiable personhood interests," meaning inventions that are
"an anticipated result of corporate direction that was con-
143. Id.
144. Id. at 649.
145. Id. at 653.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 652.
148. Cherensky, supra note 17, at 652.
149. Id. at 597.
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ceived and reduced to practice using significant corporate re-
sources, " 15° and adoption of one of "three possible methods of
applying personhood theory to employee pre-inventions. " 151
First, Cherensky argues that "the law could recognize
the justifiable personhood interests of employee-inventors in
their pre-inventions and make these interests inalienable." 152
In other words, employee-inventors could be permitted to re-
tain all of the rights in any patentable inventions they origi-
nate. Labeling this method the "non-appropriability ap-
proach," Cherensky rejects it out of concern that if employee-
inventors were the only ones who could exploit or license in-
ventions, corporations could be denied the "output of their
own laboratories," which would reduce or eliminate incen-
tives to invest in organized research and development. 5 3
Even if employers received "non-transferable, non-exclusive
shop-rights" in employee pre-inventions, Cherensky asserts
that "restrictions on alienability would preclude, at least for
employee inventions, the patent licensing and transfer agree-
ments that allow inventions to realize their optimal utility,"
again curtailing incentives to invest in innovation.154 Cher-
ensky, therefore concludes that " a regime of complete ina-
lienability is not a desirable solution to the problem of the
employee-inventor, even where schemes of... employer shop-
rights are available to soften its impact."155
Second, he posits that the law "could recognize corporate
proprietary interests in the pre-inventions of employee-in-
ventors analogous to human personhood interests. The cor-
porate interest could either cancel the employee-inventor's
personhood interest in the same property-thus making the
property alienable-or be balanced against the interests of
the employee inventor on a case-by-case basis."'56 Cherensky
rejects this "cancelling or balancing approach," because he
concludes that "a cancelling or balancing approach that com-
pares the personhood interests of humans and corporations
has serious flaws."' 57
150. Id. at 654.
151. Id. at 657.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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According to Cherensky, "[iin the kingdom of corporate
ends, everything has a price and nothing has a dignity."'58
Therefore, he reasoned that unlike human personhood inter-
ests, there are no interests that are inalienable to corpora-
tions. Per Cherensky, "[a] person cannot sell her body parts,
but a corporation can sell its divisions, or even the entire cor-
poration. Corporations can even sell what might be argued is
analogous to personality-the corporate 'good will'-though
in practice this might require the sale of the entire corpora-
tion."' 59 He therefore concluded that "the concept of protect-
ing the inalienable or noncommodifiable interests of firms is
not supportable" and "the canceling or balancing approach is
unsatisfactory as a means of allocating rights in employee
inventions."16 o
Finally, Cherensky asserts that "the law could reject cor-
porate 'personhood' interests and disaggregate the rights in-
cidental to employee pre-inventions." He maintains that
"[those interests that are justifiably constitutive of the per-
sonality of the employee-inventor could be identified and
made market-inalienable. All other rights incidental to em-
ployee pre-inventions would then be freely alienable." 16 1 It is
this, the "disaggregation approach," that Cherensky contends
is the key to using personhood theory to resolve pre-invention
disputes, through establishment of a "fungible/personal" di-
chotomy. He posits that the inventor's interests which should
be protected are "those that contribute to the inventor's self-
conception in ways inseparable from the inventive process,
those that contribute to her continuity in the inventive pro-
cess, and those that contribute to her control over the inven-
tive process," 162 which he claims can all be protected by
"granting the inventor continued access to her invention in-
dependent of her employment relationship with the as-
signee."' 63 Under this scenario, an inventor's handiwork
would always be accessible to her, but her employer would
still exercise dominion over the use and exploitation of em-
ployee created inventions.
158. Id. at 660.
159. Id.
160. Cherensky, supra note 17, at 660.
161. Id. at 657-58.




1. Critique of Cherensky's Proposal
Like the jurists that Baker and Brunel describe and criti-
cize, Cherensky's fatal flaw is his bias in favor of capital con-
tributors. Though he recognizes and decries the lack of in-
centives for employee inventors to innovate,16 4 he offers no
real proposal to motivate them. By declining to deprive in-
ventor employers of financial rewards or meaningful control
over inventions developed by employee-inventors, Cherensky
ruled out any practical solution to the lack of incentive prob-
lem he described so articulately. 165 All Cherensky is willing
to do, essentially, is grant a "reverse shop right" to the em-
ployee-inventor, which would allow the employee-inventor to
make "private personal" and experimental use of her own in-
vention, but would be of financial value to the employee-in-
ventor only if she personally founded a company to compete
with the employer,1 66 something few employee-inventors are
likely to have the resources to accomplish. The ability to re-
tain the right to use or practice one's own invention would, to
many employee-inventors, be at least a minor improvement
over the status quo. However, under Cherensky's scheme,
changing jobs even after being involuntarily terminated
would not allow an employee-inventor to confer a license on a
new employer,' 6 7 so she could not use her "reverse shop right"
to make herself desirable to potential alternative employers
in her field of inventive expertise.
68
D. Adoption by Each State of a Uniform Statute
Governing the Content of Pre-Invention
Assignment Agreements
A manager at an electrical products concern has bragged
that most employees working there "must sign an agreement
specifying in effect, that 'even if they invent something in
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Cherensky, supra note 17, at 663-66.
167. Id. at 664-65.
168. Another scholar who proposed giving employee-inventors a "reverse
shop right" asserted that they should retain a "royalty-free, non-exclusive, sin-
gly-transferable license to use any patent" they are contractually forced to as-
sign to their employers. Hovell, supra note 17, at 887. He suggested that this
version of the "reverse shop right... would make the inventor more valuable
because he could sub-license his invention to a new employer upon changing
jobs." Id.
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their sleep, it belongs to the company."' 169 Not surprisingly,
most pre-invention assignment agreements are exceedingly
broad. In response to a marked tendency of employers to
overreach within the four corners of what are already very
restrictive contracts, eight states have enacted statutes that
mildly and to varying degrees 170 protect the rights of em-
ployee-inventors who are subject to pre-invention assignment
agreements. 171 It has been suggested that every state should
enact a model pre-invention assignment agreement statute
which protects an employee's rights in private inventions un-
related to an employer's business. Such a statute, it is ar-
gued, could also require employers to notify employees of this
protection in writing, in order to "clarify for employers the
acceptable limits of pre-invention employment contracts,"
thereby reducing "both employer-employee disputes and liti-
gation regarding patent and invention ownership."'72 How-
ever, it is highly unlikely that such statutes will be promptly
and uniformly passed, and it seems very improbable that the
legislatures of traditionally "pro-employer" states would en-
act anything that even slightly protects employee-inven-
169. Stipp, supra note 40, at 1 ("Inventors are seeking bigger share of gains
from their successes.").
170. All of the state statutes except Utah's typically contain the fol-
lowing provisions: "1. Employment pre-invention assignment agree-
ments shall not apply to an invention developed by [an] employee on
his or her own time and without using employer resources. 2. An ex-
ception to the rule in item 1 may exist if the invention: a. relates to the
employer's business, or anticipated research or development of the em-
ployer; or b. results from any work performed by the employee for the
employer. 3. Any provision in an employment agreement requiring the
employee to assign an invention exempted from assignment by a state
statute and not an exception is against public policy and is void and
unenforceable. 4. The employer cannot require a provision that is un-
enforceable by way of the statute as a condition of employment or con-
tinued employment. 5. Employment agreements containing provisions
to assign or offer to assign inventions must include written notification
that the agreement does not apply to inventions as described under the
statute. 6. The burden of proof is on the employee to prove that an
invention is not assignable because it meets the requirements of the
statute and is not an exception. 7. Confidential disclosures of inven-
tions made during the term of employment are allowable for purposes
of employer review." The Utah statute is more strongly employer-
oriented.
Pisegna-Cook, supra note 18, at 179-80.
171. These states include California, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota,
North Carolina, Utah and Washington. Id.
172. Id. at 185.
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tors.173 Moreover, although one commentator wrote that
"[a]n extremely bold position for employee invention state
legislation would be a provision to require mandatory com-
pensation above regular salary compensation for any inven-
tion covered under a pre-invention assignment agreement,
comparable to the mandatory provision for federal employ-
ees," 174 there is no indication that any state is considering
incorporating such a provision in any pre-invention assign-
ment agreement statute that is already in effect, or likely to
be passed. The state statutes currently in place may some-
what enhance an employee-inventor's bargaining power with
respect to her employer, but under them "an inventor must
still assign certain patents without present or future compen-
sation. Therefore, [the statutes] do not address the more fun-
damental problem of giving the inventor a stake in [her]
invention." ' 7
5
VI. USING COLLECTIVE ACTION TO ELIMINATIE COERCED
PRE-INVENTION ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENTS
In Japan and many industrialized European countries,
employee-inventors are statutorily entitled to compensation
beyond salary and job retention for devising patentable in-
ventions.1 76 Similar legislation has been proposed in the
United States Congress, most recently in 1982, but none of
the bills passed, and in fact never even reached a vote on the
floor of either the House of Representatives or the Senate.' 77
As discussed above, American courts have an entrenched pro-
investor mind set that does not favor employee-inventors,-7 8
and like federal legislators, are not currently championing
the cause of employee-inventors.
One way to address the current disincentives to invent
without waiting for Congressional action or relying on courts
to substantially alter jurisprudence concerning pre-invention
assignment agreement would be for "pre-inventors" to organ-
ize and act collectively, by refusing to sign any pre-invention
assignment agreements in the future, by "revoking" pre-in-
173. See Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, at 414-15.
174. Pisegna-Cook, supra note 18, at 185.
175. Hovell, supra note 17, at 882-83.
176. See Orkin, supra note 7, at 654. See also Parker, supra note 17, at 615.
177. Hovell, supra note 17, 883-88.
178. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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vention assignment agreements currently in effect either
through negotiations with the companies they work for, or by
changing jobs (and refusing to sign such agreements with
new employers). Employee-inventors would then retain own-
ership of their patented inventions, and could exploit these
inventions themselves or license them to others with the
assistance of a patent collective organized by and for inven-
tors. Because the common law allows employee-inventors to
retain ownership of their patented inventions, while still giv-
ing the inventor employer benefits from the invention 179 (and
therefore an incentive to continue to invest in research and
development), collective activity by inventors that allows this
sensible jurisprudence to prevail is hardly a radical approach
to improving the incentives to invent.
Beyond its positive implications for employee-inventors,
collective activity by inventors could benefit society enor-
mously through dramatic increases in technological innova-
tion, though admittedly at the expense of inventor employ-
ers.18 0 However, inventor employers could act to minimize
any losses, and the net effect on the United States as a whole
would be disproportionately positive. If employee-inventors
use collective action to retain ownership rights in any inven-
tion they develop and patent, incentives for innovation will
increase radically, leading to higher productivity by existing
inventors and inducing larger numbers of people to become
inventors. In addition, as explained below, the problem of
"blocking patents" will be significantly reduced, and indus-
trial efficiency will increase as patented inventions are more
easily licensed by companies most willing and able to profita-
bly exploit them. Despite the cost and loss of control that this
proposal will extract from inventor employers, most compa-
nies would still be motivated to hire potential inventors and
to continue to invest in research and development at current
levels because they would retain "shop rights" and possibly
an exclusive compulsory license (if a company chooses to
purchase one) in any invention developed by an employee. In
179. For a detailed discussion of the "shop rights" doctrine, see Baker &
Brunel, supra note 17; Parker, supra note 17, at 606; Pisegna-Cook, supra note
18.
180. The term "inventor employer" is used throughout this Article to refer to
entities that employ inventors or potential inventors, such as for-profit compa-
nies, (the primary focus of this analysis) public and private universities, and
research institutions run under the auspices of the U.S. Government.
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addition, inventor employers would no longer incur litigation
expenses when the validity of a patent is challenged, and
would no longer have to fear that a disgruntled former em-
ployee-inventor on the payroll of a competitor would use in-
side information to attempt to invalidate a patent on an in-
vention she conceived and helped to develop. Instead,
inventor employers would receive litigation and technical
assistance, even from former employees, to insure that the
validity of any patent they license is upheld and the patent is
not infringed.
Only through the strength of numbers can technological
employees hope to avoid pre-invention assignment contracts
of adhesion and use their inventive prowess to elevate them-
selves to a position of bargaining strength that at least
roughly correlates to the value of the contributions they make
to their employers, if not to society in general. If increased
certainty in the rewards of invention encourages the owners
of patents to invest money in research and development, it is
only logical that the increased likelihood of sharing in the re-
wards of invention would similarly stimulate actual inven-
tors to invest time, thought and energy.18 1
A. Formation of Patent Collectives
For a variety of reasons, employee-inventors are unlikely
to unionize, 8 2 and even if they did, most labor unions are not
designed or prepared to address the problems identified
above.18 3 The most effective form of concerted activity for em-
ployee-inventors is therefore the formation of patent collec-
tives. Although the idea of patent collectives is apparently
181. See Parker, supra note 18, at 605.
182. Id. at 609; Dratler, supra note 17, at 144.
183. If technical employees joined unions, they could oppose assign-
ment agreements through the collective bargaining process. Scientists
and engineers have not organized, however, and for several reasons,
they are not now likely to do so. First, they consider unionization un-
necessary and demeaning to their status as white collar employees and
independent professionals. Second, many inventors aspire to manage-
ment positions and have no desire to alienate their superiors. Third,
even when inventors do attempt to organize, conflicts with blue collar
workers create difficulties in defining the appropriate bargaining unit,
because those workers, represented by existing unions, often do similar
or related work. Finally, when technical personnel do join existing un-
ions, the patent rights issue is of concern only to a minority of union
members, and so falls to the bottom of the agenda.
Dratler, supra note 17, at 157-58.
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somewhat novel, several copyright collectives are long estab-
lished in this country, and have been quite successful at at-
tracting members. 1 4
On behalf of their members, copyright collectives, known
as "performing rights societies," collect "license fees from ra-
dio and television stations, networks, and establishments
such as nightclubs, restaurants, and bars that present their
members' works."'8 5 Copyright holders such as composers
and lyricists become members of copyright collectives by
granting them the non-exclusive right to license the public
performance of their musical compositions; the collectives, in
turn, license these rights to radio and television stations,
nightclubs, hotels and other venues.186
Licensing fees vary from industry to industry and fees for
establishments such as restaurants and bars depend on fac-
tors such as the seating capacity, frequency of musical per-
formance, and admission charges.' 87 "Performing rights soci-
eties" also "have reciprocal relationships with foreign
societies that allow them to license each other's reperto-
ries." 88 Blanket licenses, which give licensees the right to
use any of the music in the collective's repertoire, allow copy-
right collectives to collect licensing fees simply and effi-
ciently. The licensing fees these copyright collectives garner
184. The earliest copyright collectives licensed nondramatic musi-
cal performances, where many separate works were performed in a
wide range of locations. The United States todays has two major per-
forming rights organizations, the American Society of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI").
ASCAP is an unincorporated nonprofit association with a membership
of about 29,000 writers (composers and lyricists) and 12,00 music pub-
lishers, and a repertory of about 3 million songs. BMI is a corporation
owned entirely by broadcasters with approximately 53,000 writers and
32,000 publisher affiliates, and a repertory of about 1.5 million songs.
In addition to ASCAP and BMI, performance rights for some works are
licensed by SESAC, Inc., a family-owned corporation with about 1,800
writer and about 1,130 publisher affiliates. ASCAP and BMI writers
and publishers grant to their respective organizations the nonexclusive
right to license nondramatic public performances of their works. Per-
forming rights societies also exist in many other countries.
Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA.
L. REV. 383, 385 (1992).
185. Id.
186. Ocasek v. Hegglund, 116 F.R.D. 154, 156 (D. Wyo. 1987) (as excerpted
in LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 573 (3d ed. 1989).
187. Id.
188. Besen et al., supra note 184, at 385.
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for their members are impressive. ASCAP, which has the
largest membership, had worldwide receipts of about $358
million in 1990 while "BMI's revenues for the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1991 were about 276 million."18 9
In addition to the performing rights societies, "[during
the past decade or so, copyright collectives have also been
formed to administer rights to photocopy books and articles.
These 'reproduction rights organizations' ('RRO's') license
business firms, universities, photocopying services and indi-
viduals in most developed countries." 190 "[Olther collectives
administer a variety of rights, including the rights to author-
ize sound recordings of musical works ('mechanical' rights),
rights to performances of dramatic works, rights to cable re-
transmission of broadcasts, and home taping rights."1 91 New
varieties of copyright collectives are "expected to arise as
technologies such as the videocassette recorder, the personal
computer, and the photocopying machine facilitate more
widespread and decentralized use of copyrighted materials
and make individual monitoring even more difficult."
1 92
A patent collective would operate differently from cur-
rently existing copyright collectives in some respects, as blan-
ket licenses, whereby a licensees can acquire the right to use
or perform every work in the collective's "library,"193 are un-
189. Id. at 386.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 387.
192. Id.
193. Jay M. Fujitani, Comment, Controlling the Market Power of Performing
Rights Societies: An Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation, 72
CAL. L. REV. 103, 105-06 (1984).
Composers, lyricists, and publishers become members of ASCAP
by assigning the organization the nonexclusive right to license nondra-
matic public performance of their works. ASCAP in turn grants
licenses to networks, local television and radio stations, theaters, bars,
restaurants, and other users of copyrighted music. ASCAP offers
licenses to these users on either a blanket or per-program basis. Blan-
ket licenses entitle licensees to perform any work in ASCAP's repertory
for the duration of the license - generally one year. Fees for such
licenses depend on the nature of the licensee's business, although all
similarly situated licensees must be treated equally. Generally, how-
ever, fees are a flat rate or are based upon a fixed percentage of some
measure of the licensee's gross revenues. Fees thus do not reflect the
actual number of such works used or the number of performances ren-
dered. Per-program licenses, like blanket licenses, enable the licensee
to use any work in the society's repertory. While fee percentages for
per-program licenses are generally higher than those for blanket
7171997]
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likely to be a profitable or desireable mechanism for licensing
most technological inventions. However, a patent collective
could still duplicate or adapt the aspects and qualities of
copyright collectives that have made them so successful.
Member employee-inventors would authorize a patent collec-
tive to negotiate patent licenses with entities wishing to use
or manufacture members' inventions and to administer these
licenses. The collective would retain a portion of the licensing
fees to cover its costs, pay its employees, and fund legal work,
such as defending the validity of members' patents and bring-
ing infringement actions against any entity that misappropri-
ates a member's intellectual property. Once it had a large
enough membership base, a patent collective might also un-
derwrite the costs of patent prosecution on behalf of member
inventors.
A sensible patent collective will behave in a manner that
gives corporations and other institutions strong incentives to
make substantial investments in research and development
even after employee-inventors are no longer bound by pre-in-
vention assignment agreements. One mechanism to achieve
this would be to allow a company to meet the last, best offer
made for any patented invention developed by that com-
pany's employees, thereby giving that company the opportu-
nity to obtain an exclusive license of these patented technolo-
gies, rather than simply a shop right. This de facto "right of
first refusal" would help motivate most companies to continue
to employ and support inventors.
licenses, such a percentage is exacted from the revenues for only those
programs that make use of ASCAP music.
Id. at 105-06.
In addition to eliminating the transaction and enforcement costs
that would otherwise substantially hinder the efficient exploitation of
statutory performance rights, performing rights organizations neutral-
ize the bargaining leverage many users would otherwise exert over in-
dividual composers. In particular, the blanket license provides the
composer with some market leverage against the monopsony power of
the major licensees from whom he derives a substantial portion of his
royalties. Without ASCAP and BMI, television networks could exploit
their superior market positions vis-a-vis individual composers, taking
advantage of the intense competition among composers desiring that
their works be performed on network television. By joining a collective
organization that blanket licenses music performance rights, an indi-
vidual composer can counterbalance such market power to assure re-




1. Effect on Employee-Inventors
a. Advantages
Pre-invention assignment agreements remove a powerful
economic incentive from the people who actually create in-
ventions.19 4 Patent collectives would offer many advantages
to employee-inventors, such as assistance in exploiting their
patents, which would allow them to derive financial rewards
commensurate with the market value of their inventions,
while permitting the inventors to retain radically increased
control over the scope and manner in which their inventions
would be licensed and exploited. Inventors would also be in-
creasingly able to move from corporation to corporation or
start up their own companies, 195 as once unencumbered by
pre-invention employment agreements, they would be free of
the "trailer clauses" that such agreements usually contain, 196
which restrict their ability to obtain work in the same field as
a former employer. 197
b. Disadvantages
A patent collective cannot be successfully established un-
til substantial numbers of inventors and potential inventors
194. Dratler, supra note 17, at 147-48.
195. Inventors unencumbered by pre-invention assignment agreements may
be the ideal candidates to exploit their own inventions. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick,
supra note 3, at 1.
196. Hershovitz, supra note 8, at 197-98.
197. Trailer clauses are analogous to the covenants not to compete
frequently found in employment contracts. Both clauses operate to re-
strict the former employee's ability to work in the profession in which
he is trained. Non-competitive or restrictive covenants explicitly re-
strict the employee's ability to work in the same field as his former
employer. Trailer clauses have the same effect, but through a circui-
tous route. While a trailer technically does not prohibit an inventive
employee from working for a competitor, business competitors do not
desire to hire individuals obligated under such a clause because the
work product of such employees may not accrue to the new employer's
benefit. At best, employers that hire inventive employees obligated
under such agreements will under-utilize the employees' inventive
skills so as not to develop conflicts with prior trailer clauses. This
under-utilization of a burdened inventive employee's creative capacity
may concomitantly diminish his rate of compensation. At worst, the
inventive employee is unemployed. In today's society, where technol-
ogy is advancing at breakneck speed, under-utilization or non-utiliza-
tion of inventive skill may cause an inventive employee's creative capa-
bilities and talent to atrophy.
Id. at 198-99 (citations omitted).
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act collectively to retain ownership of their patentable inven-
tions by refusing to sign pre-invention assignment agree-
ments. Attempting to extricate themselves from pre-existing
pre-invention assignment agreements and avoid signing such
contracts in the future could be personally disruptive to em-
ployee-inventors and their families, as job changes and salary
cuts may initially be required. If employee-inventors fail to
act in sufficient numbers right from the outset, a patent col-
lective would be difficult to form and sustain. Even tempo-
rary membership in a failed patent collective might brand an
employee-inventor as a troublemaker, making it difficult to
secure future employment. Optimally, some of the profes-
sional organizations that technologists belong to could aid or-
ganizing efforts, and otherwise assist the development of
fledgling patent collectives.
Even assuming adequate participation, collective action
requires that individual rights and interests be subverted to
some extent for the good of the many, a notion that might be
difficult for employee-inventors (who are often rugged indi-
vidualists) to accept. In the context of a patent collective,
though every member would be required to turn over the
same percentage of patent-generated income to the collective,
inventors of more profitable inventions would necessarily
"carry" inventors holding patents that are less financially re-
warding by providing a greater share of the collective's oper-
ating funds. One can only hope that given their current dis-
mal situation, most technologists would see that the benefits
of collective activity substantially outweigh the associated
burdens.
Although employee-inventors already have institutional
incentives and personal motives to jockey for inventive
credit19 and disputes currently arise over who gets to be a
named inventor on a patent application under the current
198. See Jon Cohen & Gary Taubes, The Culture of Credit, SCIENCE, June 23,
1995, at 1706 ("In science, as in so many other professions, the coin of the realm
is not collaborative generosity but credit - credit for individuals. One reason is
that scientists need acknowledgment for the endless hours in the lab and for
their own creativity .... But ego isn't the only reason credit is crucial in sci-
ence. At a time when budgets are tightening like vises and the number of
bright competitors seems to grow exponentially, credit for discoveries can make
the difference between treading water and sinking in a scientific career. With
credit from one's peers comes access to all important grant funding, easier pub-
lication in leading journals, and a steady supply of the grad students and
postdocs who make the lab run.").
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system, 199 if the rewards of being a named inventor increase,
the contentiousness of disputes concerning designations of in-
ventorship may intensify. On the other hand, given a larger
"reward" pool (a guaranteed percentage of royalties rather
than mere bonuses or raises doled out by stingy employers)
that is both certain and proportional to the value of the pat-
ented invention rather than at the discretion of fickle employ-
ers, employee-inventors may be more willing to cooperatively
share credit and inventorship.
Whatever the effect a larger and more predictable "re-
ward pool" has upon the willingness of employee-inventors to
share the inventor designation, shared control over inven-
tions and patent rights is an issue patent collectives will have
to contend with. By statute, each joint inventor can indepen-
dently exploit a patent, even though this might be detrimen-
tal to her co-inventors.2 ° ° One might expect that in a typical
situation today, all joint inventors are employed by the same
or collaborating institutions, and all have signed pre-inven-
tion assignment agreements depriving them of ownership of
inventions before any inventions even exist, so there are few
conflicts between joint inventors. In the wake of collective ac-
tion as called for in this article, co-inventors would retain
ownership and control of their patented inventions (subject to
the rights retained by their employers as described above and
below), and may have conflicting views about how this control
should be exercised. Where all joint inventors belong to the
same or cooperative patent collectives, the rewards of a pat-
ent can be evenly distributed rather easily, but disposition of
control issues within a collective may require implementation
of a binding dispute resolution mechanism.
Where joint inventors were members of competing (and
therefore noncooperative) patent collectives, or where one or
more coinventor eschewed patent collectives altogether, non-
199. See, e.g., Haskell v. Colebourne, 671 F.2d 1362 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Rival
Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prod. Co., 358 F. Supp. 91 (W.D. Miss. 1973).
200. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994) ("In the absence of any agreement to the con-
trary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use or sell the patented
invention within the United States, or import the patented invention into the
United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other own-
ers."). See also Deborah Perrotta, Estate Planning for Owners of Patents and
Copyrights, EST. PLAN., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 94; Fina Tech., Inc. v. Ewen, 857 F.
Supp. 1151 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Lemelson v. Synergistics Research Corp., 669 F.
Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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member inventors could exploit patents in a manner that was
detrimental to both the member co-inventors and to the pat-
ent collective itself. For their part, inventor employers would
be eager to have nonmember employees designated as inven-
tors on patents emerging from their companies as a way to
retain full control over such patents (as presumably, such em-
ployees would continue to be voluntarily bound by pre-inven-
tion assignment agreements). Such "split" ownership would
also provide employers with a mechanism for undermining
patent collectives, by depriving them of royalties and making
them appear weak and ineffectual. At least initially, patent
collectives will have to cooperate with each other to some ex-
tent to survive (hopefully such mutual assistance would fall
short of antitrust violations); such survival may also depend
upon high rates of membership within productive research
and development laboratories.
2. Effect on Inventor Employers
There is no denying the fact that the financial rewards
and control regained by employee-inventors come at the "ex-
pense" of inventor employers, whose ongoing ability to cir-
cumvent the dictates of the common law through pre-inven-
tion assignment agreements will be thwarted. This is
entirely justified because the benefits to society dispropor-
tionately outweigh the "losses" of inventor employers when
these employers are unable to contract around the common
law as it pertains to patent ownership. The refusal of inven-
tor-employees to sign pre-invention employment agreements
is unlikely to significantly effect investment in research and
development, as inventor employers would still be motivated
by the promise of a shop right in anything developed by their
employees, as well as the possibility of an exclusive "compul-
sory" license if it meets the last, best licensing offer negoti-
ated by the collective. The same desire for a competitive ad-
vantage that propels corporations to invest in research and
development in the first place20 1 will drive them to adapt to a
framework of patent collectives, wherein every player bene-
fits from fruitful innovative strategies rather than just inven-
tor employers.
201. See generally Kim Clark, Investment in New Technology and Competi-
tive Advantage, in THE COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE: STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL
INNOVATION AND RENEWAL 59 (David J. Teece ed. 1987).
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Even now many patented inventions are not necessarily
exploited by the companies whose employee-inventors de-
velop them, as evidenced by the licensing disputes that fre-
quently find their way into the federal courts. It should be
easier for companies desiring to exploit potentially profitable
inventions to negotiate licenses from patent collectives rather
than from their competitors, leading to a more efficient distri-
bution of inventions. The effect of patent collectives on com-
panies that license, rather than originate, the inventions they
exploit will therefore be positive, or at a minimum, neutral.
Though employer inventors will likely be adamant about
retaining ownership of patents that are invented by their em-
ployees and will undoubtedly fight any attempt at collective
action by employee-inventors to deprive them of this total
possession, most have shown little interest in increasing their
rates of innovation even when the spoils of a profitable patent
are completely and squarely theirs. Despite their subjuga-
tion of employee-inventors through the widespread use of
easily and predictably enforceable pre-invention assignment
agreements as a condition of employment and the "pro pat-
ent" (or minimally, "predictable") jurisprudence of the Fed-
eral Circuit,2" 2 American companies have not been substan-
tially or consistently increased their investment in research
and development 20 3 and high technology employment levels
have been declining.20 4 This seemingly contradictory behav-
ior by corporations is actually quite rational from the stand-
point of corporate management: the fewer the profitable pat-
entable inventions its employees develop, the tighter the
stranglehold the corporation will exert upon the dwindling
innovations emerging from the minds and hands of its inven-
tive employees.
202. See discussion infra Part III.
203. Robert H. Hayes, U.S. Competitiveness: "Resurgence" Versus Reality,
CHALLENGE, Mar. 13, 1996, at 36 ("Despite the widely heralded increase of in-
vestment over the past three years, (not an unusual phenomenon when econo-
mies emerge from the bottom of a business cycle),... American industry is still
reinvesting a substantially smaller percentage of its revenues and profits than
it did fifteen years ago. In addition, government spending on public infrastruc-
ture has steadily declined to less than half (as a percentage of GNP) the level of
thirty years ago. And with the cutbacks in government-sponsored R&D, total
R&D has also fallen. Even though nondefense R&D has risen somewhat to
compensate, the total is still about the same percentage of GDP as it was
twenty-five years ago - and a third less than Germany's and Japan's.").
204. Zoltan J. Acs, Does Research Create Jobs?, CHALLENGE, Jan. 1996, at 32.
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3. Advantages to Society
The big societal payoff for successful collective action by
employee-inventors is clearly increased incentives for individ-
ual inventors to innovate.20 5 The benefits of this increased
inventiveness can reasonably be expected to include im-
proved productivity and profitability for existing U.S. compa-
nies, with a corresponding improvement in the GDP and bal-
ance of trade picture. Also, more start up companies are
likely to be founded by inventors who opt to exploit their in-
ventions on their own, and creating even more "wealth"2
0 6
and employment opportunities for fellow inventors and
others than a large corporation would during the course of
exploiting a single invention.20 7 Employee-inventors would
no longer be foreclosed by pre-invention assignment agree-
ments from joining or forming spin off companies, and would
be immune to the potential sluggishness and disinterest of
large corporations.20
Americans will also benefit from increased industrial effi-
ciency. Inventions that are not quite right for the companies
where they are developed can be more readily shopped
around by the inventor, with assistance from a patent collec-
tive, to companies that are better positioned to productively
exploit the invention. Moreover, employee-inventors unbur-
dened by "trailer clauses" will be able to move to companies
where they feel most comfortable and are likely to be most
inventively productive.
Collective activity by inventors would also reduce or
eliminate the difficulties and inefficiencies wrought by
205. Financial incentives alone will increase inventive productivity. See
Parker, supra note 17, at 605; John P. Sutton, The Inventor's Interest, in PAT-
ENT POLICY: GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIC, AND INDUSTRY CONCEPTS 150, 152-53
(Willard Marcy, ed. 1978). But see Arvid Zuber, Creativity in Industrial Re-
search Laboratories, in PATENT POLICY: GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIC, AND INDUS-
TRY CONCEPTS 148 (Willard Marcy, ed. 1978).
206. See Shawn Tully, The I.P.O. Boom: How to Make $400,000,000 in Just
One Minute..., FORTUNE, May 27, 1996, at 84.
207. See Dratler, supra note 18. See also Hanspeter Gassman, Globalisation
and Industrial Competitiveness, OECD OBSERVER, Dec. 10, 1995, available in
1995 WL 8451848, at 10 ("It is generally recognised that [small and medium-
sized enterprises] are becoming more important for four main reasons: they are
often innovative; they contribute to the net creation of employment; they often
are good exporters of new products; and they increasingly contribute to improv-
ing the skills of the workforce, especially in high-tech activities and in appren-
ticeship training.").
208. See Dratler, supra note 17, at 147.
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"blocking patents," because individual inventors belonging to
patent collectives will be more apt to behave cooperatively
than competing firms. A "blocking patent" problem occurs
when the invention embodied by a patent, typically a "pio-
neer" or "revolutionary" invention, is improved upon by an-
other inventor. The later inventor may obtain a patent on
her improvement, but she will be unable to practice or license
her patented improvement without the acquiescence of (and a
license from) the holder of the original patent. The owner of
the original invention is positioned to drive a very hard bar-
gain with the holder of the improvement patent, who can ex-
pect to derive revenue from her invention which is signifi-
cantly less than its market value because the excess value
will go to the original patent holder in the form of licensing
fees. In addition, the original inventor can prevent the "im-
provement invention" from being practiced at all by withhold-
ing a license and/or threatening an infringement action.
Where the original and improvement patents are held by
competing institutions, a desire by the the original patent
holder to protect market share, for example, could lead to a
complete refusal to license the patent to an improvement pat-
ent holder, to the detriment of both the secondary patent
owner and society at large, which is deprived of the improved
product or process until the original patent expires. Obvi-
ously, the "blocking patent" problem is a strong disincentive
for competitors to innovate around "pioneer" or "revolution-
ary" ideas, despite the benefits that such innovation could of-
fer anyone affected by the original invention.2 °9
Where original and improvement patents were both con-
trolled by members of the same or cooperating patent collec-
tives, the collectives might initially struggle over the fairest
manner of distributing royalties generated by an improve-
ment patent between the original and improvement paten-
tees. However, once a policy was in place, such royalties
could be apportioned according to a preordained formula pre-
viously agreed to by each inventor as a condition for member-
ship in the patent collective. In addition to decreasing patent
related strife between corporations, collective action by em-
ployee-inventors would also reduce the unsavory (at least to
this author) spectacle of Goliath corporations and their law-
209. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Break-
down: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
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yers challenging underfunded and underrepresented individ-
ual inventors in court, as strong patent collectives could em-
ploy attorneys of the same caliber as those generally retained
by large corporations.
In addition to the dramatic effect that patent collectives
could have on the lives and productivity of employee-inven-
tors, such collectives would also be a boon to independent in-
ventors who lack the resources or talent to exploit their in-
ventions themselves. Though such independent inventors
are currently free to license their inventions, they may lack
the sophistication or access to do so on their own, and no for-
mal licensing programs are currently in place to assist
them. 210 A patent collective could provide all the support in-
dependent inventors require to fully exploit their inventions,
to the benefit of everyone.
4. Potential External Barriers to Patent Collectives
a. Antitrust Concerns
Just as copyright collectives did, and labor unions before
them, the formation of patent collectives will raise the specter
of antitrust violations. Antitrust concerns are generally
raised in the context of copyright collectives when such a col-
lective issues blanket licenses, whereby, for example, in ex-
change for royalty payments, a radio station is granted the
right to play any song by any artist member of the collec-
tive.2 11 Blanket licensing practices by performing rights soci-
eties brought allegations of price fixing, to which many judges
were sympathetic. However, after protracted litigation, the
Supreme Court held that "reasonable" blanket licensing by
A.S.C.A.P. and B.M.I. did not necessarily violate the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act.212
Because potential licensees are apt to want the rights to
only one or, at most, a few patented inventions at a time, pat-
ent collectives are unlikely to be in a position to negotiate
blanket licenses of anywhere near the scope of those issued
by copyright collectives. Evidence of direct, unhindered nego-
210. See R. Stephen Parker et al., The New Independent Inventor: Implica-
tions for Corporate Policy, REV. Bus., Mar. 22, 1996, at 7, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Mags File.
211. See, e.g., Fujitani, supra note 193.
212. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979). See, e.g., Fujitani, supra note 193.
726 [Vol. 37
EMPLOYEE-INVENTORS
tiations between patent collectives and potential licensees
would temper antitrust concerns, 213 and patent collectives
could use the lessons of copyright jurisprudence to tailor le-
gally sustainable licensing policies.
Pre-invention assignment agreements themselves can re-
sult in "undue concentration of economic power in a given
area of technology."214 Only large entities have the resources
to engage in substantial levels of research and development,
which enables them to obtain the bulk of government re-
search contracts. The funding accompanying these contracts
enables these entities to acquire the top researchers and most
sophisticated equipment, which can lead to predominance in
specific areas of technology and "a spiraling technological ag-
glomeration which may concentrate both expertise and the
most modern facilities in a few of the largest concerns."215
Patents are monopolies by definition, granted as a means
of fostering innovation. Corporations, universities and gov-
ernment institutions are currently permitted to hire as many
inventors as they choose, and to hold the rights to as many
patents as their employee-inventors can garner for them. It
would be darkly ironic if inventors were precluded from col-
lective activity on the basis of antitrust concerns, when the
outcome of such collective action would be of such great bene-
fit to society.
b. Judicial Expansion of "Hired-To-Invent"
Doctrine by Employer-Friendly Courts
Unlike the other proposals described and critiqued
above, at the outset formation of a patent collective does not
require enabling legislation or other Congressional or Execu-
tive action, or fundamental changes in judicial doctrine or in-
terpretation. However, successful operation of a patent col-
lective could be undermined by either. Employer friendly
courts could start to decide that most inventor-employees are
actually "hired to invent" even non-linear inventions so that,
in accordance with existing doctrine2" 6 , employers receive
213. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1.
214. Dratler, supra note 17, at 146-47.
215. Id.
216. If an employee is hired to invent, the employee must assign his
entire right, title, and interest in any patents arising from inventions
conceptualized during employment and stemming from the tasks dele-
gated to him by his employer. If not specifically expressed in the em-
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ownership of patent rights regardless of whether a pre-inven-
tion assignment agreement is in place. An expansion of the
scope of the "hired-to-invent" doctrine would be a disconcert-
ingly simple matter, as even presently the definition of inven-
tion-for hire is both murky and malleable.217 There is some
indication that this doctrine is already expanding, as evi-
denced by recent judicial willingness to award ownership of
patent rights to inventor employers based on "implicit" pre-
invention assignment agreements.218
A predisposition of the courts to find that inventorship is
part of every technologists' job description would severely un-
dermine the ability of employee-inventors to gain control of
their inventions. Retention of ownership rights by employee-
inventors could be effectively limited to patentable inventions
outside the scope of the inventor employer's commercial and
experimental fields. It would therefore be imperative that
courts did not expand the common law definition of workers
employed to invent. It would be far preferable if the courts
were to abandon the "hired-to-invent" doctrine altogether, as
even employees who are "hired to invent" potentially patenta-
ble linear inventions are not in reality provided with even
moderately detailed instructions, despite the doctrine's as-
sumption that they receive extensive and specific direction
from their employing entity. Though the inventive process
may be linear in some "hired-to-invent" contexts, with a
clearly defined goal at the outset and provision of equipment
and resources dedicated to that goal, invention is still seren-
dipitous in nature.2 19 While technological advancement
might be an anticipated outcome of such linear resource dedi-
cation, contrivance of something that is sufficiently novel,
useful, and nonobvious (in a word, patentable) cannot.
If an inventor employer could direct and predict the out-
come of an inventor's research and development, any inven-
tion produced at the employer's specific direction would be
ployment contract, it is implicit that what the employee is hired to in-
vent will become the sole property of the employer. An employee hired
to invent is akin to a 'hired gun.'
Hershovitz, supra note 8, at 194-95 (citations omitted).
217. See Christopher M. Mislow, "Necessity May Be the Mother of Invention,
But Who Gets Custody?," The Ownership of Intellectual Property Created by An
Employed Inventor, 1 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 59, 62-67.
218. Baker & Brunel, supra note 17, at 405.
219. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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unpatentable due to the invention's obviousness: Predict-
able, derivative inventions, are by definition "obvious" and
therefore fail to meet an important criteria of patentabil-
ity.220 The hired-to-invent doctrine should therefore be ex-
posed and rejected for what it is, unjustified, employee-inven-
tor oppressing, judicial pro-employerism.
VII. CONCLUSION
If, as has been suggested, only one out of every ten inven-
tions conceived by an employee-inventor warrants a patent
application, and only one out of ten patent application (or one
out of every hundred inventions conceived) is ultimately prof-
itable, tremendous numbers of ideas must be generated to ad-
vance the state of any given art or science.221 Cherensky as-
serted that in the current environment, employee-inventors
forced to work under the constraints of pre-invention assign-
ment agreements can protect their interests only by either
starting their own companies before they conceive potentially
profitable patentable inventions, which is probably an avenue
open only to a few employee-inventors with an abundance of
both self-confidence and financial resources, or by becoming
"non-inventors," at the expense of whatever industry they
work in, and of society at large.222 To the detriment of us all,
this is the option that creative minds are likely to continue to
choose unless inventor-employees unite and engage in collec-
tive activity, such as the formation of patent collectives.
220. See generally ROBERT MERGERS, PAT. LAW & POLICY ch. 5 (1992).
221. Parker, supra note 17, at 604.
222. Ultimately... employee-inventors are perfectly capable of act-
ing to protect their personhood interest themselves, either by becoming
independent inventors or by becoming non-inventors.... However,
their departure can turn into a serious resource allocation problem for
society. In a perverse way, then current patent and contract doctrine
may be reducing rather than enhancing social welfare.
Cherensky, supra note 17, at 668.
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